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ABSTRACT 
 
BEFORE THE COLLAPSE OF THE PUBLIC: A STUDY OF THE CONDITIONS OF 
POSSIBILITY OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE BETWEEN THE PERIOD SINCE THE LATE 
OTTOMAN UNTIL THE EARLY 2000S THROUGH THE EXEMPLARY SUBJECTIVITIES OF 
MEHMET AKİF ERSOY AND MİTHAT CEMAL KUNTAY 
 
Öğüt, Ayşe Nur. 
MA in Cultural Studies 
Thesis Advisor: Assist. Prof. Fatih Altuğ 
July 2017, 92 pages 
 
Jürgen Habermas explains in his theory of the “public sphere” how the enriched bour-
geois class created a literary public sphere in coffee houses, salons and reading 
groups between the 17th and the 18th century. The fundamental characteristic of the 
public sphere is that it prioritizes equality and brings people from various segments 
of the society together, regardless of their differences.  
 
Though the coffee houses began to take shape in the 16th century in the Ottoman 
Empire, the formation of an effective public sphere corresponds to the 19th century. 
The public sphere was created by the intellectuals in the Ottoman Empire, though it 
was formed by the attempts of the bourgeois class in Europe. In my thesis, I have 
tried to examine the public communications of these intellectuals, through the ex-
emplary case of the friendship of Mehmet Akif Ersoy, a Muslim intellectual, and 
Mithat Cemal Kuntay, a secular intellectual.  
 
In the early republican era, coffee houses started to lose their former structure and 
cultural identity because of the numerous forms of censorship for ideological rea-
sons. In this period, Islam (and Muslims) were othered by being considered a threat 
that would potentially cause backwardness. As an inevitable result, the public sphere 
became increasingly ideological, dominated by ideological conflicts. The effects of 
this predicament can still be observed today.  
v 
In this thesis, by using the Habermasian theory of the public sphere, I study the 
polarization that has existed in the academy until the early 2000s and the hegemonic 
approach of secular academics towards Muslim scholars. Focusing on the friendship 
of Mehmet Akif and Mithat Cemal, I also research how the crisis of the public sphere 
in the academy can(not) be overcome by scrutinizing the changing dynamics of the 
public sphere throughout the period from the late Ottoman to the early republican 
times. 
 
Keywords: Public sphere, academic polarization, secular intellectuals, Muslim intel-
lectuals 
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ÖZ 
 
KAMUNUN ÇÖKÜŞÜNDEN ÖNCE: MEHMET AKİF ERSOY VE MİTHAT CEMAL 
KUNTAY'IN ÖRNEK FAİLLİKLERİ ÜZERİNDEN OSMANLI SON DÖNEMİ VE ERKEN 
2000LERE DEĞİN KAMUSAL ALANIN İMKÂN ŞARTLARI ÜZERİNE BİR ÇALIŞMA 
 
Öğüt, Ayşe Nur. 
Kültürel Çalışmalar Yüksek Lisans Programı 
Tez Danışmanı: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Fatih Altuğ 
Temmuz 2017, 92 sayfa 
 
Jürgen Habermas “kamusal alan” teorisinde, zenginleşen burjuvanın 17-18. yüzyıl Av-
rupa’sında kafeler, salonlar ve okuma grupları oluşturarak edebî bir kamusal alan kur-
masından bahseder. Kamusal alanın en önemli özelliği, eşitliği hâkim kılması ve top-
lumun her kesiminden insanı bir araya getirebilmesidir.  
 
Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda her ne kadar kahvehaneler 16. yüzyılda şekillenmeye baş-
ladıysa da etkili bir kamu(oyu)nun oluşması 19. yüzyıla denk düşer. Kahvehaneler, kı-
raathaneler ve özel toplantılarla aktif bir kamusal hayat ortaya çıkar. Kamusal alan, 
Avrupa’da burjuvanın teşebbüsüyle teşekkül etmiş olmasına karşın Osmanlı İmpara-
torluğu’nda entelektüeller tarafından husûle getirilmiştir. Bu tezde, bu entelektüelle-
rin kamusal alandaki iletişimlerini temsilen Müslüman bir entelektüel olan Mehmet 
Akif Ersoy ile seküler bir entelektüel olan Mithat Cemal Kuntay’ın arkadaşlığının 
imkân şartlarını inceledim.  
 
Erken Cumhuriyet Dönemi’nde ise, kahvehaneler ideolojik gerekçelerle çeşitli sansür-
lere uğrayarak eski canlılığını ve kültürel hüviyetini yitirmeye başlar. Bu dönemde İs-
lam (ve Müslümanlar) devletin geri kalma sebebi olarak gösterilerek ötekileştirilir. Bu 
ötekileştirmenin kaçınılmaz bir sonucu olarak, kamusal alan giderek ideolojikleşir, 
ideolojik çatışmalar tarafından domine edilir. Bu durumun etkileri günümüze kadar 
devam etmiştir.  
 
vii 
Bu tezde, Habermasçı kamusal alan teorisinden faydalanarak, akademide 2000lere 
değin mevcut olan kutuplaşmayı ve seküler akademisyenlerin Müslüman akademisy-
enlere olan hegemonik yaklaşımını inceliyorum. Akademinin kamusal alan krizinin 
aşılamamasının sebeplerini ise –Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’ndan Türkiye Cumhuriyeti’ne 
değin değişen kamusal alan dinamiklerini inceleyerek– Mehmet Akif ve Mithat 
Cemal’in bugün mahrum bulunduğumuz kamusal iletişime örnek teşkil ettiğini düşün-
düğüm arkadaşlığı üzerinden araştırıyorum. 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Kamusal alan, akademik kutuplaşma, seküler entelektüeller, 
Müslüman entelektüeller.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Can we say that the present ideological break, the antagonism resulting in the ghet-
toization between the secular and Muslim intellectuals in Turkey has already existed 
since time immemorial? If it has not, then why and how this sort of break has been 
taking place? Is it possible to talk about –so to speak– an “utopic” period in past in 
which these subjects could rationally communicate each other by eliminating 
paradigmatic ontological breaks between their subjectivities? Was there a period in 
which secular and Muslim (so called Islamist) intellectuals together embodied a “pub-
lic” in order to discuss the public good and criticize the official ideology and its appa-
ratuses?  
 
If so, how did these different intellectuals manage to overcome the obstacles pre-
venting the coexistence, build the bridges closing the abysses, sublate the negativities 
originating in the paradigmatic breaks in the past? How did they achieve to interact 
and communicate each other? In short, what were the conditions of the possibility of 
the communication through which political, philosophical and literary ideas circulate 
between antagonist intellectual groups? What sort of subjectivity enabled rival intel-
lectuals to coexist? In my Master’s thesis, I will trace these questions by studying the 
subjectivities and habitus of two exemplary figures of the aforementioned two major 
rival ideological stances of modern Turkey; Mehmet Akif Ersoy and Mithat Cemal 
Kuntay.  
 
1.1. Ghettoization of Intellectual Communities 
As far as I can see, almost all of the members of the intelligentsia in Turkey have 
imprisoned themselves in one of two sorts of ghettos –namely “the secular ghetto” 
and “the Muslim ghetto”– without even imagining to take a step to outside. Between 
these two “major” ghettos there is a significant asymmetry, an explicit hierarchy: The 
secular side has occupied the position of the master and hegemonize the intellectual-
2 
academic field, while the Muslim has occupied the ex-ceptional position of the slave 
who should be repressed, assimilated, ruled, disciplined by the hegemonic Master.  
 
In departments of social science in particular at the distinguished universities of Tur-
key (Boğaziçi University, Bilgi University, Sabancı University, Bilkent University, 
ODTÜ) which have functioned as the ideological apparatuses of secularism, we could 
observe that there has been an apparent lack of Muslim academics and Islamic dis-
courses. This situation unavoidably has caused these hegemonic universities deter-
mining the rules of the academic field. Moreover, they have transformed themselves 
to an enormous secular ghetto reflecting itself onto the political mirror at which the 
Muslim subjects unconfidently have lookedlike the actual and genuine intellectual 
urban. As a consequence, the secular intelligentsia of Turkey has not interacted with 
Islam and Muslim intellectuals, have not opened any space for the Muslim academics 
at the public universities, and thus have continued to preserve the gap between the 
secular “urban” (major ghetto) and the Muslim (minor) ghetto.  
 
Although there is not an obscene public discourse branding, the Muslim intellectual 
as an abject, pathological, and (potentially) criminal other (who might steal 
the enjoyment of the secular), the visible material structure of the academic field 
excluding (sacrificing) the Muslim intellectual attracts my attention. I want to explore 
the ideology (in the Althusserian sense) of a secular apartheid that realizes itself fully 
in the corporeal world obscenely by materializing this sort of segregationist discourse 
that is never enunciated publicly. In the material structure of this ideology, Muslim 
intellectuals have appeared as not only a “reactionary agent” but also both 
a hostis1 and an inimicus.2 They have isolated themselves from the secular ideas and 
have not tolerated any opposition against themselves, have not given the right their 
other to live but just confined them to their reactionary ideas. In this respect, I will 
look at if the “reactionary” Muslim intellectual is eternal and if there were different 
Muslim subjectivities in the intellectual field in a certain historical period.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
1 Public enemy in the Schmittian terms. 
2 Private enemy in the Schmittian terms. 
3 
1.2. Not the Discourse but the Ideology 
In this social-cultural apartheid regime, secularism constitutes the center while Islam 
expatriated to the colonized periphery. Because of this desolation, Turkey encounters 
the private ghettos in the absence of the public. At this point, the question to be 
asked is, if there was public in a certain historical period embodied by both secular 
and Muslim intellectuals, then what was the breakpoint that caused its collapse or 
transformation into private ghettos late times.  
 
However, contrary to this existing ideological constellation, these two rival groups 
had strong connections with each other, had a common space in which all together 
could constitute a public, a body of “rational communication” ghettoizing just the 
ghettoization itself in the past. In these years, secular and Muslim intellectuals to-
gether were reading and discussing both Ghazali and Voltaire, criticizing both 
Abdülhamid II and the political-social ethos, speaking both Arabic and French. It indi-
cates the fact that the ideological break between them did not lead to the lack of 
communication. Therefore, the ideological break was not constituting a barrier to the 
passion for freedom, annihilate the possibility of symbolic interactions. The common 
habitus (dispositions, tendencies, inclinations) of these subjects stood as a hard rock 
against the flood of ideological antagonism, manifested itself as the common (mate-
rial) ideology ghettoizing the internal ideological antagonisms. Although the vast ma-
jority of these intellectuals were state officials, they still could manage to distance 
themselves from the official ideology. But how did they manage to rescue themselves 
from the official ideology and its subjectivizing interpellations?  
 
1.3. Two Paradigms: Mehmet Akif and Mithat Cemal 
In this study, I will focus on the “Mehmet Akif” monography of Mithat Cemal 
Kuntay which was released in 1939. It describes the circumstances and the conditions 
of the beginning of the 20th century and tells the stories of the subjectivities of the 
Ottoman intellectuals. By taking Giorgio Agamben's claim that the example itself 
ontologically and etymologically means “paradigm” into consideration, I will put 
Mehmet Akif Ersoy and Mithat Cemal Kuntay in the center of my thesis as the most 
“public” examples of the “secular” and the “Muslim” and focus on the monography 
4 
of Mehmet Akif written by his friend Mithat Cemal, the very subject seeming to be 
the ideological hostis of Mehmet Akif. I consider that Mehmet Akif’s life, his intellec-
tuality, his way of living, interpreting the Islam and his relationships with secular peo-
ple (especially with Mithat Cemal) are noteworthy to highlight the change in this in-
teraction to the antagonism between the secular and Muslim intellectuals.  
 
Besides Mehmet Akif, there were other significant intellectuals whom Muslim intel-
lectuals and political gladiators refer mostly, such as Said Nursi, Mustafa Sabri Efendi, 
Ömer Ferid Kâm, Mahir İz, Elmalılı Hamdi Yazır who lived in the process of the foun-
dation of the Republic of Turkey. Such instances, in general, share certain character-
istics transgressing the negative prejudices of the secular apartheid, i.e. being open 
(hospitable) to the West, secular texts, secular ideas, secular lifestyle so forth. Hence, 
I will trace the possible conditions of the subjectivity that brings these subjects to-
gether.  
 
In my thesis, I aim to reflect the conditions of possibilities of the public sphere in the 
late-Ottoman period and in the early republican era, considering the intellectuals 
with regard to their positions that gather them around the same table and try to un-
derstand each other. Also, I will analyze the break that brought the ghettoization be-
tween the secular and Muslim academics in Turkey focusing on until the early 2000s.3 
My main questions as follow:  How did they establish this kind of a community (pub-
lic)? What were the possibilities and impossibilities of this condition? How did they 
go beyond that paradigmatic break and establish this community? With respect to 
these questions, I aim to present a thorough analysis of this paradigmatic break, how 
the public sphere has been constituted and changed.  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
3 I limited my study to the early 2000s because the academics uttered the quotes that I have 
put in my thesis in this period, in which we can observe the traces of polarization and hegem-
ony. 
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CHAPTER 2 
STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE PUBLIC 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the transformation of the “public” through-
out the period in which the notion of public emerged. In order to disclose the content 
of the notion of public, I will try to reveal its historical process of unfolding itself with 
regard to its dialectical relationship with the notion of private by discussing the simi-
larities and the differences between them. I will also analyze the history of the “bour-
geois public” in particular, in order to elucidate the characteristics of “the literary 
public,” as an inevitable consequence of the establishment of bourgeois public. And 
finally, I will endeavor to show that there is an immediate relation between the con-
ditions of the possibilities (establishment) of the public and the conditions of the im-
possibilities (collapse) of the public.  
 
Mitsein4 is one of the fundamental conditions of human existence (Dasein).5 What 
sustains the human relations are plurality and speech, which have been the core ele-
ments of politics since ancient times (Arendt, 1998, p. 7). Plurality, with its distinction 
and equality characteristics, is vital to a public. While the distinction among human 
beings provides each of them a certain identity, action, speech and also a cause for 
conflicting with each other, as for the equality among them, human beings become 
capable of understanding each other, planning, and foreseeing the needs of future 
generations (Arendt, 1998, p. 175).  
 
Plurality provides the basis for speech as well. In the absence of plurality, there is only 
meaningless talking. However, speech, through the apparatus of plurality and the de-
sire of being among men, makes the experience of an individual immortal (Arendt, 
1998, p. 4). That is why the verbs “to live” and “to be among men” were synonyms 
(inter homines esse) in the Latin language: Being able to speak was equal to being in  
                                                                                                                                                                    
4 Being-with, living-together in the Heideggerian terms. 
5 Dasein in the Heideggerian terms. 
6 
the polis,6 and it was an essential stimulus for the Ancient Greeks to leave their 
households7 and become members of a public (Arendt, 1998, p. 197) where they 
could distinguish themselves from animals and overcome the finite materiality of 
animal life (zoe)8 by submitting themselves to the infinite realm of logos9 
(language/discourse, God, reason, symbolic order). In short, plurality and speech are 
the fundamentals of not only the public but also of human existence’s infinitely dis-
tinguishing itself from the finite animal presence.  
 
Even though the plurality of human beings enables the establishment of the public, 
it also has the power of collapsing the public itself. The singularity (difference) of each 
human being and the diversity among humanity always constitute an obstacle to the 
stability of the public (Cangızbay, 2004, p. 291). Without destroying these transcen-
dental peculiarities (singularity and diversity) of human beings, it is impossible to re-
alize an ideal public model. However, in order to maintain human relations and to 
establish a public, the most convenient way has been coming to a common ground 
through plurality.  
 
All in all, public stands at equal distance to all subjects and provides a basis for com-
munication. Therefore, it is suitable to be a place of debate, participation, and critical 
discourse (Özbek, 2004, p. 33, 510). The public is what makes society a common in-
terest and gathers them together to express and share their ideas.  
 
2.1. The Term Public 
In this section, I will give the historical background of the term “public” with respect 
to its immediate relation with the terms “private,” “publicity,” and “publicness.”  
                                                                                                                                                                    
6 The sphere of a city-state in Ancient Greece that belonged to free men. 
7 In the household, there was no freedom. Therefore, in order to be free, a citizen had to 
show himself in the polis. 
8 Bare life in the “Agambenian terms. 
9 A Heideggerian term. 
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2.1.1. The Transformation of the Concept of Public 
Like all other empty (master) signifier, the signifier “public” has various signifieds that 
are produced and enunciated within power mechanisms (discourse, institution, prac-
tice) unfolding themselves in different historical contexts. First of all, in ancient Rome, 
the signifier “public” generally signified res publica, a group of people who did not 
have any family, intimate connections, or the “bond of a crowd” (Sennett, 2002, p. 3-
4). Raymond Geuss (2001) extends the meaning of res publica to the common prop-
erty of Roman citizens, matters of common concern to all Romans, and the common 
good of all Romans (p. 36).  
 
The word “public” has always been the relative of the word publicité or “publicity.” 
The first recorded meaning of the word “public” in 1470 was “common good in soci-
ety.” In 1542, it designated something that “is manifest and open to general obser-
vation.” In the era of the Renaissance, it connoted the “common good and the body 
politic” (Sennett, 2002, p. 16). In 17th-century France, le public included the court, the 
town and its nobles, and some of the bourgeoisie10 (Habermas, 1991, p. 5). This public 
was the audience for plays. It consisted of readers, observers, and critics of art and 
literature (Habermas, 1991, p. 31).  
 
At the end of the 17th century, the public came to mean an “openness to the scrutiny 
of anyone,” while private was used to indicate a restricted area containing only family 
and friends. In the 18th century, the word “public” gained its contemporary meaning 
in the sense of a realm including family and friends with a wide range of strangers 
(Sennett, 2002, p. 16-17). In a general sense, the public can be defined as everything 
which is open to all, such as the marketplace, fountain, and so on (Habermas, 1991, 
p. 1). 
 
However, it should be kept in mind that in current everyday politics, “public” is asso-
ciated with the state and its operations concerning the taking care of the “people” 
(Habermas, 1979, p. 198). In addition, Meral Özbek emphasizes the wider aspect of 
                                                                                                                                                                    
10 The bourgeoisie used to connote “rulers, administrators, financial support, and a good part 
of (….) its population” (Sennett, 2002, p. 47). 
8 
the public in the Turkish language: the “public” could be matched with kamu, 
kamuoyu, umumi, aleni, and amme in Turkish. Furthermore, the public is sometimes 
thought of as miscellaneous means ranging from organs of the state to media and 
even public opinion (Özbek, 1994, p. 30, 37).  
 
2.1.2. The Differences Between the Public and the Private 
2.1.2.1 Historical Background of the Division 
One of the central debates around the notion of public unavoidably manifests itself 
in the dichotomy of public-private. In ancient Greek city-states, in order to participate 
in public life, a person had to have property and, slaves and be free (Habermas, 1991, 
p. 3), and should not bring his matters of oikonomia,11 the very sphere of zoe and pre-
political village life, to the public sphere of polis. The sphere of polis and oikos12 were 
strictly divided.  
 
With the rise of the city-state, the human capacity to organize collective human ac-
tivity and the natural association of a human being (the family) drifted apart. As a 
consequence, each individual and citizen had two sorts of existence: personal and 
communal (Arendt, 1998, p. 24), zoe and bios,13 oikos and polis, economic and polit-
ical, exceptional and canonical, and private and public.  
 
As for the feudal society of the Middle Ages, there was not an obvious status differ-
ence between the public and the private as there was in Greek thought. The public 
did not show itself as something distinguished from the private sphere. Attributes of 
lordship, such as the ducal seal, were classified as public, but only in the sense of a 
status. Other statuses, such as manorial lord, were not classified in terms of public or 
private, though they were declared publicly (Habermas, 1991, p. 5, 7). In all meetings, 
there was a sort of representation. The lords did not represent their subjects, but 
their positions. In other words, there was not the public, but more a publicity of rep-
resentation.  
                                                                                                                                                                    
11 The law of the house. 
12 The realm that contains a family, its property, and its house. 
13 The qualified life of the citizen in the Agambenian terms. 
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In the 16th century, humanism entered into the court and changed the life of the lords 
and nobles. New sorts of men emerged, and a new society appeared in the court. The 
public became an openness to general observation of the subjects, providing a cer-
tain accessibility to law and politics for every citizen. In the 17th century, the word 
started also encompassing the court, aristocrats, and the bourgeoisie. While the pro-
vincial nobility started losing the publicity of representation in time, the power of the 
prince’s court to represent remained the same (Habermas, 1991, p. 9).  
 
Following the Renaissance, with the rise of aristocratic society, representative pub-
licness became a tool for the representative monarchy and thus public gradually lost 
its strength. With the 18th century, the word started to signify the family, friends, and 
unfamiliar persons as well. In this century, with an individualized court nobility, an 
increasingly capitalist commercial economy, the waning of feudal powers, and the 
rise of territorial and national power states turned society into a delimited “good so-
ciety” (Habermas, 1991, p. 9-11).  
 
These were the first indications of a clash between the private and public sphere in 
modern times. While the means of representative publicness could be listed as the 
feudal powers, the church, the prince, and the nobles, they were also divided into 
private and public parts. The public became more unbiased when compared to its 
transformation from representative publicness to the form of “civil society.”14 In 
consequence, the military and the bureaucracy, the residues of the privatized court, 
developed into the public authority or judicial organs, as the elements of 
occupational status group organization evolved into the sphere of civil society, which 
stands in opposition to the state as a private autonomy (Habermas, 1991, p. 10-12). 
In other words, the public became more a place of legal intervention than of arbitrary 
decisions (Geuss, 2002, p. 77).  
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
14 In the English translation of the book it is used as the “bourgeois public sphere.” 
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2.1.2.2 The Division in Which They Merge 
Richard Sennett (2002), with regard to Jean Jacques Rousseau’s view of the public as 
“social relations of mutual dependence” (p. 117), assesses the controversy between 
the public and private as more “a matter of checks and balances than absolute hos-
tility.” From this point of view, the relation between them could be described as a 
mutual interaction in which the private undertakes the role of checking and control-
ling the public, while the public has a corrective function on the private. They are 
“complex evolutionary chains” (Sennett, 2002, p. 91).  
 
Geuss (2001) exemplifies his statement by quoting from the Oxford Latin Dictionary: 
While giving one of the meaning of publicus, through relating it the word “pubes” as 
“the pubic region, the private parts; the pubic hair” he directly connects the origin of 
the public with the notion of private (p. 35). He evaluates the “well entrenched” dis-
tinction between the public and the private as a consequence of a historical process 
(Geuss, 2001, p. 5). The distinction among them is an “an ideological concretion” (p. 
10). According to Sennett, “while man made himself in public, he realized his nature 
in the private realm” (Sennett, 2002, p. 18-19). Although these two different spheres 
seem different, they are in fact complementary.  
 
By giving the historical background and transformation of the word “public,” I have 
aimed to reflect the extent of its profundity and the degree to which it has intermin-
gled with the word private. Even though it seems like there are strict boundaries be-
tween these two fields, I have tried to show that they also are closely connected. By 
stating their precise relationship, I mean to demonstrate the direct effect of the pri-
vate on the collapse of the public, as it is one of the public’s main ingredients, in the 
following parts of my thesis.  
 
At last, I embrace the issue of the public sphere as Hannah Arendt’s analogy of a ta-
ble: As a table is located between those who sit around it; the world, like every in-
between, relates and separates men at the same time” (Arendt, 1998, p. 52). The 
public as a table organizes the masses but also separates them in an organized way. 
In this public sphere, anyone can take the floor, and everyone has the possibility of 
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seeing the same thing. This table, in other words, allows individuals to meet, share 
things and have common sense.  
 
In the next section and chapter, I will extend the scope of the term in the sense of 
public sphere, which combines the idea of public as a realm that is accessible to all 
and one that is open to general observation. Then, I will mention the establishment 
of literary spheres in Europe, associate it with the Ottoman intellectual, cultural at-
mosphere in the 19th and 20th centuries, and relate it with the Turkish academy.  
 
2.1.3. Publicity as a Supplement of the Public 
Publicity, as the “organizational principle of . . . political order” (Habermas, 1991, p. 
4), is the essential component of the public, in which whatever shows up can be wit-
nessed by everyone (Arendt, p. 50). In the monarchy period, references to publicity 
were almost non-existent due to the fact that an organized public was considered as 
a threat to monarchical sovereignty. The only valid allusion to “publicity,” without 
involving a proper public, was to be found in the “private” chanceries of princes, 
which does not make up publicity in modern terms (Habermas, 1991, p. 35). The lack 
of publicity in this period prevented the people from having information about the 
political issues surrounding them. This was only possible with the unfolding of the 
process of the democratization (becoming public) of the press.  
 
At a time when the public was included in the parliament, the press in Great Britain 
found the opportunity of entering into the critical political debates, mostly due to the 
vacation of the parliamentary privilege in 1771. In 1803, this temporary opportunity 
became legalized and permanent (Habermas, 1998, p. 61) and established its place 
in common affairs. From this date onwards, the publicity of the parliamentary de-
bates gradually solidified its influence in public matters, which, as I shall explain later, 
banded together with the delegates and voters.  
 
It was the press that triggered the emergence of publicity. Despite the fact that the 
press does not have the power to determine the decisions of the public absolutely, 
or direct access to political power, with its communicational power-that is, its ability 
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to transport and mobilize information (Habermas, 1998, p. 183) –it produces domi-
nance and monopoly on public opinion, both of which have an indirect influence on 
the process of policy-making.  
 
In accordance with the emergence of the notion of publicity, the concept of “public 
opinion,” which gives the impression that the public sphere is one and inseparable 
and consists of a general feeling shared by the entirety of the nation, first emerged 
in the late 17th and early 18th centuries (Habermas, 1998, p. 14, 56).  
 
However, the notion of public opinion does not produce only communitarian ideol-
ogy but also libertarian ideology: Hegel depicts public opinion as a means of achieving 
total freedom by allowing individuals to produce and declare ideas, opinions, and 
consequently, to participate in the public with their suggestions qua contributions to 
the objectivity of the state, which, in return, also directs the destiny of public men (p. 
100, 117, 120). Kant considers such a contribution as a way of enlightenment (Haber-
mas, 1998, p. 104). Understood as such, public opinion is associated with hope. As 
Geuss (2001) states:  
The hope that it can be mobilized as a brake on forms of irrational, self-serv-
ing, inhumane, and despotic power, and to protect “the public” against mal-
administration and miscarriages of justice, and the more general hope that it 
can be harnessed as a far-reaching force for civilizing manners and tastes, and 
that public discussion may promote tolerance -a highly praised virtue- and 
contribute to the formation of rational political goals and policies. (p. 87)  
All in all, publicity is a requirement for the emergence and sustenance of the public 
sphere as being constituted of subjects, which have the right to demand information. 
It encourages all levels of society to seek a domain, where they would be involved in 
public issues and would become a part of public opinion. Publicity also realizes the 
public sphere by taking place in the public eye and vice versa. The press undertakes 
the most vital function in the solidification of publicity by leading and guiding public 
opinion, which, in return, allows the press to have an indirect say in policy-making 
processes.  
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2.2. The History of the Public Sphere 
There was no single space for subjects to express their political opinions when there 
was representative publicness. This is corroborated by the fact that the state and the 
court were a mere area of “secluded royalty” in which public thinking and deciding 
activity were confined only to themselves (Habermas, 1998, p. 32). In other words, 
the representation of public had not come into question yet. The bourgeoisie was 
only in possession of the realm of commodity exchange and social labor, and they 
had no right to utter their political ideas. As a result, the need of a bourgeois public 
sphere emerged as a necessity. 
 
In the 13th century, a more stabilized organization of the society’s power structure 
appeared in estates through the agency of capitalism. Moreover, an inevitable break 
up occurred in the society because of the traffic in commodities and news. The accel-
eration of finance and trade capitalism brought about a new social order. Before, the 
towns had their local markets, which were held by corporations and guilds. However, 
these local markets controlled only the nearby fields, rather than free commodity 
exchange between towns and countries. With regard to the increase in long-distance 
trade, there arose new types of markets developed in stock exchanges and ruled by 
political power (Habermas, 1998, p. 15). As a result of the expanding markets, a re-
quirement for more frequent and exact news emerged. And this triggered the re-
organization of the communication system in the 14th century. This communication 
system, supported by the merchants, turned into a “kind of guild-based system of 
correspondence” (Habermas, 1998, p. 16).  
 
The effect of the traffic in commodities and news showed itself for the first time in 
mercantilist phase. Starting with the 16th century, merchant companies expanded 
their areas by opening new markets that turned into stock companies. With regard 
to nations’ quickening nature in the mercantilist phase, the personal loan system of 
the prince and public borrowing were not sufficient anymore. At this time, only a 
taxation system would suffice to meet the need of the capital demand. Accordingly, 
the separation between personal properties of the prince and the state accelerated. 
In order to reduce the effects of representative publicness, the state brought local 
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administrations under its control (Habermas, 1998, p. 17). From this time on, the 
public became a rearranged apparatus which could no longer be controlled by an 
authoritarian prince.  
 
As a result of a depersonalized state authority, “civil society” emerged. Through the 
civil society, the dependencies and activities of the household economy made their 
presence known to the public. The private sphere gained a public status, becoming 
apparent in the daylight. At this very time, the bourgeois became visible as the pro-
tagonist of the public, by virtue of the modern state apparatus. Private people be-
came the addressees of this public authority as well, becoming aware of their power 
as well as the state (Habermas, 1998, p. 20-23).  
 
The private sphere of civil society transformed into an essential organ of the public 
authority. The public authority widened its limits to become accessible for everyone, 
including those excluded from the public area. A new sort of equality came about 
that was only possible outside the state and its political realm of absolutism. In this 
new establishment, the press undertook one of the most important parts of strength-
ening the society to stand up in opposition to the state (Habermas, 1998, p. 18, 24, 
35).  
 
Despite the fact that the emergence of the institutions of the press and postal ser-
vices almost coincided with the foundation of the stock market, they were not acces-
sible for everyone, for the press was taken under control of the state with the proc-
lamations of the king. The political journals, including the journeys of princes, arrivals 
of foreign dignitaries, special events at court, and rescripts, were the subjects of state 
surveillance. Later, the advertisers become an essential apparatus of the state. Even 
though it seemed that the address of these proclamations was the people, they were 
not common men at that time, but rather educated men.  
 
It was in the 17th century that, the press became public. While the press had previ-
ously been controlled by the state, in the 18th century, the society entered into the 
field of the press and became the formers and addressees of the state. Through the 
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merging of the editorial and advertising sections, the press passed into hands of cer-
tain partakers from private individuals. Therefore, it became a gateway for private 
persons to occupy the public sphere by prerogative (Habermas, 1998, p. 21, 185). 
To summarize, the characteristics of the public have changed through the time with 
regard to political, economic, and social shifts. While in the past, it was not attainable 
to everyone with its representative publicness feature, it gained a publicness feature 
starting with the 16th century. From that time on, every subject in a state had the 
opportunity to share their opinions and ideas and enter into debates, which became 
the foundation of civil society. Civil society was based upon equality. The state 
became more objectified, while the private sphere became more public. The bour-
geoisie and the press played important roles in the rise of civil society, embodying 
public authority. All in all, the public started containing and addressing every individ-
ual in it.  
 
2.2.1. The Emergence of the Bourgeois Men 
The 18th century was a significant one, as it witnessed the emergence of “bourgeois 
men,” along with the rise of the modern state apparatus. This new stratum included 
various groups of officials, primarily jurists, doctors, professors, scholars, and pastors. 
In addition, the capitalists became an appendant part of the stratum, including mer-
chants, manufacturers, entrepreneurs, and bankers. What makes the bourgeois 
men’s role remarkable was that they simply performed as the main operator in the 
society and as the carrier of the public, specifically the reading public. In time, the 
reading public held a position that increased the tension between the town and the 
court. It was essentially being supported by the press, which pragmatically attempted 
to maintain its position to be able to reflect the main tension and critiques (Haber-
mas, 1998, p. 23). Therefore, it should be noted that the bourgeoisie effectively trig-
gered the public by transforming it both politically and culturally, in a way that culmi-
nated in the revival of the town and citizens.  
 
It is important to note that, the town, as the epicenter of the civil society, performed 
a transformative role both economically and socially in Great Britain. Through its cof-
fee houses and salons, it consisted of an asylum for the courtly noble society and the 
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bourgeois avant-garde of the educated middle class. While their main debates were 
around the commodity exchange and social labor, in time, the bourgeoisie acquired 
the information of critical-rational public debate and their topics of discussion 
evolved into a more intellectual level. Furthermore, the bourgeoisie, gaining power 
both economically and culturally, started supporting the artists (Habermas, 1998, p. 
27-29, 33). To the degree to which the bourgeois public sphere strengthened the cul-
tural atmosphere, the minds of the public became enchained.  
 
Even though the realm of the bourgeois public located itself in between the highly 
charged atmosphere of the state and society, it kept itself as part of the private 
sphere as well (Habermas, 1998, p. 141). This was because the first public sphere (as 
the bourgeois public sphere) was a production of the private sphere with regard to 
its autonomous nature. This also proves that there is not a total disengagement be-
tween the public and the private spheres, but more a mutual interaction.  
 
2.2.2. The Transformation of Towns as the Center of Public Spheres 
To the extent that the town expanded, the social networks and capacity of the town 
augmented widely and diversely. While in the late 17th and 18th centuries, city 
squares functioned as spaces of gathering. From the 17th century onwards, there 
emerged new types of socializing mechanisms, such as cafes, parks, and theaters. 
While back in the past, urban amenities were only for the privileged, now, they be-
came more accessible to a wider spectrum in society (Sennett, 2002, p. 17, 54). This 
means that there occurred various new spaces in which strangers could meet, in a 
way that enabled social interaction, and, enhanced the range of possibilities for the 
spread of new ideas. Along with the transformation of the coffee shops, coach inns, 
parks, and cafes into active social centers, theaters and operas were also deprivatized 
to wider strata (Sennett, 2002, p. 17, 85), which opened new ways for cultural level 
to rise. The shift that I briefly mentioned above did not only transform the daily life 
and socializing codes of laboring classes but also helped cultural consciousness to be 
able to circulate in every level in the society.  
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In what follows, in the period of 1680-1730, the towns in Great Britain and France 
became literal and (then, political) critical centers with their salons, table societies 
and coffee houses, in which many gatherings were held (Sennett, 2002, p. 30; Haber-
mas, 1998, p. 30). These gatherings made it possible for people, regardless of their 
statuses, to share and exchange opinion and, have conversations about a wide range 
of topics. The main reason for this is that these gatherings were primarily based upon 
the prior principle of an absolute equality and union among participants. Thus, every 
segment of the society could have the opportunity to embrace others, and be em-
braced by others, through these public spheres.  
 
2.2.3. Public Sphere in the Republic of Letters 
As I have stated before, there have been different types of public spheres throughout 
history. The representative publicness was the primitive and initial version. Over 
time, having experienced various shifts and progress, it transformed into more mod-
ern forms. The literary public sphere was the precursor of the political public sphere. 
There is a reciprocal relation between the literary and the political public sphere 
which is because the emergent critical reasoning in the art affects the political-eco-
nomical area (Habermas, 1998, p. 32). Accordingly, the literary public sphere pro-
duces a political public sphere, while the political public sphere has the opportunity 
of re-producing it.  
 
The history of the literary public sphere was established on the periodicals that 
turned into a topic of discussion in coffee houses. While the bourgeoisie was reading 
and considering periodicals as a material of discussion in coffee house gatherings, 
meanwhile, they were also eager to participate, by writing letters to these periodi-
cals, centering their own concerns, and emphasizing their own interpretations. Pub-
lishers started to publish the letters of their readers, which encouraged the coffee 
shop owners to issue their own newspapers. This interaction created a dialectical re-
lationship between periodicals and the public: The public was now vigorously a part 
of social interaction via these periodicals and could gain the opportunity to produce 
discussions on both their personal and communal concerns (Habermas, 1998, pp. 41-
43; Sennett, 2002, p. 81). By the role of these periodicals, the public experienced a 
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new level of self-consciousness. That is, the members of the public were not only 
passive objects, or addressees to be interpellated anymore; they were now knowing 
subjects and the very producers of the cultural environment.  
 
Cultural interaction was started by periodicals, and sustained by newspapers, book 
clubs, and reading circles. By the agency of book clubs, subscription libraries, and 
reading circles, the bourgeoisie found a chance for self-fulfillment. Reading a novel 
became another chance for the bourgeoisie to exceed their own limits, restrained by 
the privacy rules in the past (Habermas, 1998, p. 51). The effects of these cultural 
interactions were not restricted only to the cultural level, but also could be observed 
on a personal basis.  
 
Newspapers were the main bearer of this cultural process. Karl Bücher asserts that 
the newspapers transformed “from mere institutions for the publication of news into 
bearers and leaders of public opinion-weapons of party politics” (as cited in Haber-
mas, 1979, p. 200). Therefore, newspapers developed into a director of public opin-
ion and discussion.  
 
As the corollary of the literary public sphere, the self-interpretation of the public im-
proved the political realm. Three years after the French Revolution, in 1792, public 
criticism in the critical debate of political issues gained an indirect acceptance. Ever 
since, public opinion was to be talked about, not in the sense of average opinions, 
but by the agency of contemplation and discussions around public issues (Habermas, 
1998, p. 55, 94). Furthermore, the literary public sphere distinguished itself with re-
gard to its inclusive nature when compared to representative publicness. Through its 
comprehensiveness, culture found a way of widening its scope and turned into some-
thing commoditized (Habermas, 1998, p. 29).  
 
In short, the literary public sphere is not only one of the public sphere types, but also 
the very ancestor of all. Even though the public in question did not exist exactly in 
that period, it was institutionalized for the first time as a modernized version of rep-
resentative publicness. It was primarily important for my concern since the public 
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sphere is based upon the principle of equality and inclusiveness. In the foundation of 
the literary public sphere, periodicals followed by newspapers, reading circles, and 
book clubs played an important role, both as a subject matter and later as a mediator 
of the ideas of the coffee-shop customers. While media educated and directed the 
audiences, the audiences also started to create a voice of their own and experience 
a new level of consciousness for themselves. In consequence, public opinion had the 
chance to progress, as culture turned into a sort of commodity that could circulate 
among society.  
 
2.3. The Destruction of the Public 
2.3.1. The Expansion of the City 
Before the rise of the public, a community was basically a group of people who knew 
each one another. This, later fragmented due to the extension of the city. The in-
crease in trade activities generated a need for employment in the commercial, finan-
cial, and bureaucratic sectors. Especially from the 18th century, a youthful population 
immigrated to big capitals, such as London and Paris. While in the past, people knew 
their identity via generations, with the broadening of markets, the occupation trans-
mission in the 18th century was also annihilated (Sennett, 2002, pp. 57- 58). This shift 
changed the nature of a city from being a world in which everyone knew each other 
to a world full of strangers. After that, distinguishing people from one another be-
came difficult, and people’s degree of contact with one another decreased. That is to 
say, people turned into strangers in their isolated lives.  
 
2.3.2. The Break in Human Relations 
Rousseau offers that, in order to maintain social relations, one should perform as an 
actor. Addressing the same issue, Sennett likens the world to a theater. Similarly, in 
the Christian doctrine, there is a belief called theatrum mundi, in which God is con-
ceived as an audience and the world as a theater. However, what happened in the 
18th century is that people attempted to undertake the role of the auditor, to desire 
the role of God as it was perceived by the traditional understanding of the world. The 
world turned into a place of both performing and beholding. The connotation of the-
atrum mundi thus changed: Firstly, social life was not a steady notion anymore; it was 
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full of illusions and delusions. Secondly, due to their theatrical characteristic, acts of 
the actors were unpredictable and changeable. Thirdly, humans began performing 
(Sennett, 2002, p. 35).  
 
In the 19th century, the rise of personality in the public realm made intimate society 
ineluctable while the public became a function of the private and the private turned 
into the one and only important matter (Arendt, 2002, p. 69). This period coincided 
with the discovery of psychoanalysis and the unconscious: These notions were re-
garded as threats to the privacy of people, who feared that their hidden feelings and 
thoughts could be exposed to the public. People's solution to this predicament was 
insensibility, which was equal to silence. Consequently, there emerged a belief that 
people should not talk to strangers and that everyone had the right to be alone and 
to have an invisible shield. The concern of revealing the personality to someone else 
made everyone obsessed about themselves, which rendered intimate society possi-
ble. Even though they were impersonal matters, all social issues, in order to have a 
meaning, turned into a matter of personality (Sennett, 2002, pp. 22, 27, 219).  
 
Electronic communication was yet another stimulator that brought the course of 
public life to a deadlock. While increasing people’s knowledge of one another, it de-
creased the level of mutual communication (Sennett, 2002, p. 282). All of this led to 
a decrease in social activities, with people hiding their emotions and characteristics. 
There was more encounter but less interaction. This, also, started deteriorating the 
intimate life in concordance with the public.  
 
Another effect which accelerated the collapse of the public took place via the upsurge 
of industrialism in the late 18th century. Before industrialism, in order to regulate so-
cial standing, the occupation of each person could be distinguished through their 
characteristic garments, ribbons, and wigs. However, via the standardization of in-
dustrialism, the multi-colored structure of the public was downgraded. The 
community became more homogenized considering machine-made objects (Sennett, 
2002, p. 20, 65, 146). Tradesmen moved into offices and stores. These fields were 
moved from personal stages to impersonal bases. Industrial capitalism changed the 
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lives of individuals’ insomuch that it transformed the distinguishing character of pri-
vacy to coincide with the realm of the public.  
 
Hans Bahrdt points out this issue as in the following:  
The process of urbanization can be described as a progressive polarization of 
social life under the aspects of “public” and “private.” . . . The reciprocity of 
the public and the private spheres is disturbed. It is not disturbed because the 
city dweller is mass man per se and hence no longer has any sensibility for the 
cultivation of the private sphere; but because he no longer succeeds in getting 
an overview of the ever more complicated life of the city as a whole in such a 
fashion that it is really public for him. The more the city as a whole is trans-
formed into a barely penetrable jungle, the more he withdraws into his sphere 
of privacy which in turn is extended ever further. (as cited in Habermas, 1998, 
158-9)  
That is to say, the uniqueness and the communication patterns of individuals, which 
were the unique character of human beings, were about to disappear. 
 
2.3.3. The Obligation of Normalization 
One of the main reasons that make it impossible to constitute a public was the obli-
gation of normalization in society. This means that in society, everyone “expects from 
each of its members a certain kind of conduct, imposing innumerable and various 
rules, all of which tend to ‘normalize’ its members, to make them behave, to exclude 
spontaneous action or outstanding achievement” (Arendt, 2002, p. 40). This under-
standing of society began to demand members to be normalized and disciplined citi-
zens. Since then, several social groups were absorbed by the society, resulting from 
the despotism of normalization.  
 
2.3.4. The Emergence of the Social Realm 
The emergence of the social realm was a momentous step in the erosion of the pub-
lic, and one that coincided with the birth of the modern age and its political form, 
which can be traced back to the nation-state (Arendt, 1998, p. 28). Habermas (1998) 
analyzes this “re-politicized social sphere” in the sense of the “societalization” of the 
state and “stateification” of society (p. 142). This new sphere reflected itself within a 
portrayal of a seemingly merging yet basically hidden polarization. While capitalism 
became even more organized in the century following the golden era of liberalism, 
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the public and private sphere became less integrated (p. 140). Since then, not only 
society but also the private sphere and political sphere lost their defense. To be pre-
cise, while the public and private permeated each other, not only did a “repoliticized 
social sphere” arise, but also the public sphere lost its publicness while the private 
was deprived of its autonomy.  
 
2.3.5. The Effects of Neoliberalism 
It would be fair to claim that one of the critical factors in the devastation of the public 
is neoliberalism. Before listing the transformative and destructive effects of neolib-
eralism, one should briefly introduce the thought. Neoliberalism is more than a mere 
ideology or economic policy, but rather a “new governmental rationality” that is 
based upon the governmentality of individuals’ lives (Dardot & Laval, 2014, p. 9).  
 
Governmentality is the governance of people through self-control. This governance 
is essential; neoliberalism reflects itself as a competition that requires the subject to 
construct himself as a company. Work is the one and only necessity of self-realization, 
according to the neoliberal subject. Individuals are the entrepreneurs in the market, 
which functions as a stimulator to construct their own subject. Peter Drucker likens 
this situation to “global shopping center” (as cited in Dardot & Laval 2014). This shop-
ping center breaks into our lives and diffuses our ways of living, feeling and thinking 
via its means, such as work.  
 
While in the past, caring for one’s interest and acting through enjoyment was consid-
ered as a low thing, in neoliberal times, these are the essential elements of becoming 
a neoliberal subject. The neoliberal subjects only care for their own self and interests, 
try to satisfy their self-love, and have an ambition which impels themselves. They 
maximize their interests and enjoyment while minimizing pain as their main actuator. 
It is now a Panopticon, to use Bentham’s term, in which everyone watches one an-
other (Dardot & Laval, 2014).  
 
In this system, self-management is established in a way that corresponds with the 
management of the society. In a Lacanian sense, this process transforms the desire 
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of the subject into the desire of other. That is to say, modern power -or in other words 
neoliberalism- tries to be subject’s other. Creating and improving become essentials 
in order to have a self-capital. Sufficiency is one of the main components the neolib-
eral subject seeks. Primal purposes on which the life is established on has become 
“success,” “encouragement,” “empowerment.” This view of life has succeeded to 
convince people to justify that in the lack of these factors, one can be easily sacrificed 
(Dardot & Laval, 2014). Moreover, the illusion of working for themselves prevents the 
subjects from being alienated and breaks the distances between them and their com-
pany.  
 
All in all, in this new illusory system, neoliberal subjects are produced in such a way 
that they can easily adapt to this collapsed new world. To maximize profit, some sub-
jects have to be sacrificed –a predicament that leads us to the destructive Gemein-
schaft in which spirit is replaced with egocentrism.  
 
2.3.6. The Destructive Gemeinschaft 
The main characteristic of intimate society is the emphasis its members put on the 
community. Communal identity is especially formed under the pressure of threat 
(Sennett, 2002, p. 222). Through this unity, they feel close to each other, strengthen 
the ties among them and construct a society. This is what Ferdinand Tönnies called 
Gemeinschaf which defines society with regard to its close social interactions. In time, 
Sennett modernized the concept as destructive Gemeinschaft, which designates the 
reduced Gemeinschaft trapped at a personal level. This is because the Gemeinschaft 
does not exist anymore; there is now instead a more destructive one.  
 
In modern society, there are no longer common, accepted codes of conduct for man-
ners, speech, attire, and so on. These have been replaced on the individual level with 
personal desire. This means that all that the society is left with is pure fantasy, cov-
ered by the illusion of the possibility of building a sort of common personality. Form-
ing a community requires disposing of the enemies to consolidate their fraternity 
(Sennett, 2002, pp. 222-223, 266). In the case of Turkey, a destructive Gemeinschaft 
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and a ghettoization exist between the seculars and the Muslims, which I will discuss 
in the next chapter.  
 
2.4. Conclusion 
To conclude, the public sphere is vivacious in every field of the state in order to inter-
fere into the common issues and gather all subjectivities in this public sphere. How-
ever, in modern societies, –especially when my argument is considered in Turkey– 
debate and even negotiation have become a threat. As I have tried to explain, in this 
newly established neoliberal community, private life has become an untouchable 
area for individuals. This simply makes it hard to talk about a communal spirit or a 
collective belief, which can be evaluated as the eventual results of the destructive 
Gemeinschaft.  
 
What I mainly offer is that the public has been through various levels and steps of 
transformation over time and that these have caused the public sphere to lose its 
ground. It should be helpful at this point to recall the “table analogy” of Arendt, in 
which she explicitly argues that the possibility of gathering around the table has been 
annulled. The reasons for this impossibility, to me, could be stated as follows: the 
expansion of the city, industrialization, the effect of psychoanalysis as a fear of dis-
closure, normalization, and electronic communication. Accordingly, the possibility of 
multi-vocality and an intersubjective communication in order to reach a collective 
will have been abolished.  
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CHAPTER 3 
THE EMERGENCE OF THE PUBLIC IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 
 
“Were you a poet of suspicion with you 
magnificent poetry, you would be revered 
by today’s generation.” 
(Kuntay, 2005, p. 288)15 
 
When the peculiarity of the Habermasian public sphere theory is taken into consid-
eration, one could easily remember that the atmosphere of rational debate in public 
is produced and provided by the literary public sphere. One should also remember 
that a society’s ability to merge different strata, thus, equality are the fundamental 
conditions in order to constitute a public sphere. In this sense, I will mention a gath-
ering that was held in 1924, the very pre-turning point of the Ottoman Empire, fol-
lowing the paradigmatic break that covered the early republican era. I will be partic-
ularly emphasizing the ways in which it reflects the characteristic of the Ottoman 
public sphere, which should be evaluated in the way it signifies a pattern of how the 
public sphere was formed in the Ottoman Empire.  
 
This gathering was held in Mithat Cemal Kuntay’s house, to celebrate the newly pub-
lished book of Mehmet Akif Ersoy: Asım. What makes this gathering a unique one,16 
for our concern, that it assembles a series of names like Mehmet Akif, Mithat Cemal, 
Sami Paşazade Sezai, Cenap Şehabettin and Abdülhak Hamid, all of which could easily 
be distinguished from Mehmet Akif with regard to their ideals and lifestyles, consid-
ering the present circumstances of the society. What I aim to emphasize here, despite 
the divergence among the guests, is the possibility ofencounters, of being able to 
gather around the same table, the way it is articulated in the table analogy of Arendt.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
15 The translation of the quotes after this part belongs to me unless stated otherwise. 
16 Another gathering place for Mehmet Akif and his friends was a teahouse called The Tea-
house of İsmail Ağa in Direklerarası where they discussed the politics and literature (Eşref 
Edip, 1962, p. 285). During the period he stayed in Taceddin Dergahı, the dervish convent 
became a center for literature gatherings (Eşref Edip, 1962, p. 173). 
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This part of the chapter will mainly focus on the friendship of Mehmet Akif Ersoy and 
Mithat Cemal Kuntay, based upon the monography of Mehmet Akif Ersoy written by 
Mithat Cemal Kuntay.17 Based on this monography and portrayal, it is plausible to 
mention of two main poles of ideologies, in which Mehmet Akif represents the Mus-
lim thought, and Mithat Cemal represents more of a secular18 and modern lifestyle. 
From this standpoint, the main concern in this chapter will be to investigate the con-
ditions of public sphere in the Ottoman Empire by focusing on the uniqueness of this 
gathering, and the friendship of Mehmet Akif and Mithat Cemal. The further analysis 
will be given in the last chapter as followed by the conditions of public sphere in the 
republican era. 
 
In this gathering, which took place in the apartment of Mithat Cemal, in Mısır Apart-
manı,19 each of the guests read their poems and then, others declared their views 
around each piece of work (Ayvazoğlu, 2014, p. 4), as the Habermasian sense public 
                                                                                                                                                                    
17 It was published in 1939, in the name of Mehmet Akif. 
18 Defining religiosity and secularity can be a controversial issue to discuss. However, in my 
thesis, I see Mehmet Akif as, first and foremost, a Muslim with respect to both his way of 
living and his belief. Accordingly, Mithat Cemal referred to Mehmet Akif by highlighting his 
Muslim identity in his monography, who, as opposed to Mehmet Akif, was mainly marked by 
his European life style and attitudes.  
Mithat Cemal was evaluated by Taha Toros (1992) as follows: “He looked European from the 
outside, yet, in the inside, his heart was beating as a Turk” (p. 102) He also wrote an article 
in which he defended and praised Islam (Sanay, 2002, p. 194-199). However, I believe that 
his cultural Islamic attitude and Mehmet Akif’s religious observance are different phenom-
ena. Mithat Cemal was not atheist but neither did he follow the commands and instructions 
of religion altogether. In this respect, one should remember that his easy-going attitudes to-
wards a woman, was considered morally low by conservative İbnülemin Mahmut Kemal (To-
ros, 1992, p. 104).  
Though one may get confused towards Cemal’s personal feelings about being a believer, his 
position was obviously critic when it comes to consider Islam as a highlighted identity in social 
life. In this regard, I should emphasize that, by secularism, I aim to signify it as a particular 
attitude of separating one's way of living from one's belief. It is, again, important to remind 
that he was not a disbeliever, yet, he distinguished how he lived from what he believed in 
the inside. In his own words, he confesses: “I was so deeply a believer in the inside, I feared 
in the inside, while I seemed to be a godless. I alluded to my metaphor swiftly lest something 
befall me: “You know what, Mr. Mehmet Akif” I said, 'religions are Asticots which are used to 
trick the masses." (Kuntay, 2005, p. 3-4). I think that his despising attitude, especially towards 
a Muslim man, is a sign of his secularist view as well. 
19 This building is located right in the middle of Pera which signifies the modern, secular, and 
Westernized thought. Furthermore, Mehmet Akif spent his last ill days in this building as well, 
as the guest of the Egypt Khedive Abbas Halim Paşa. 
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sphere offers. The guests entered the house with their shoes on, as an indication of 
engagement to the European life style (Ayvazoğlu, 2014, p. 5-6). All of them, except 
for Mehmet Akif, wanted to drink alcohol during the meeting. So, they gave a look at 
Mehmet Akif to understand whether they would have his approval. He said: “You can 
do whatever you want unless you offer me” (Ayvazoğlu, 2014). That is to say, Mehmet 
Akif clearly stated that it did not pose a problem for him, as long as his boundaries 
and principles are not violated in a way. Central here is the idea that Mehmet Akif 
portrays a prescription for consisting a public among people of divergent ideas and 
beliefs, which prioritizes coexisting and intellectual production before ideological dif-
ferences.  
 
3.1. Mehmet Akif Ersoy and Mithat Cemal Kuntay 
Before widening the scope, I would like to give some general information about 
Mehmet Akif Ersoy and Mithat Cemal Kuntay’s lives, characteristic and world per-
spectives. Mehmet Akif Ersoy (1873-1936) was a poet, an academic, and an intellec-
tual, who, later on, became prominent as the author of Turkish National Anthem. 
After having a regular Ottoman education in local schools (mahalle mektebi), he went 
to newly-emerged high schools, in the name of İdadi. After, he became one of the 
first students of Halkalı Baytar Mektebi (Halkalı Veterinary School). He taught litera-
ture in the Darülfünûn (House of Multiple Sciences) and Halkalı Ziraat Mektebi 
(Halkalı Agricultural School).He went to foreign countries by Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa (Spe-
cial Organization) and reflected his observations into his poems. He was editor in 
chief of Sebilürreşad. He became a deputy of Burdur in the first parliament, in 1920. 
However, he was in the Opponent Group and did not enter the second parliament. 
After he was being chased by the spies of the Republic (Eşref Edip, 2011, p. 153), he 
went to Egypt and stayed there for 11 years until his illness. In 1936, he returned to 
Turkey and died in Mısır Apartmanı which Mithat Cemal used to live in the past.  
 
Mithat Cemal Kuntay (1885-1956) was a poet, novelist, notary, and an intellectual. 
He studied in Mekteb-i Osmani (Ottoman School) and then, in Saint Joseph High 
School for a short time, leaving for the Vefa İdadisi (Vefa High School). When he was 
17, he lost his father and had to start working, in order to earn a livelihood of his 
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family. He worked as a private tutor, as a journalist and as a lawyer over the years. 
He gained his bachelor in Mekteb-i Hukuk (Law School) which was followed by a PhD 
and gave him the title of first Law Doctorate in Turkey. He wrote the monographies 
of Namık Kemal, Ali Suavi, and Mehmet Akif. He became popular by his novel Üç İs-
tanbul which is considered an autobiography. In this novel, the protagonist Adnan is 
remarked as a secular, atheist while Mehmet Raif represents an uncompromising reli-
gionist. In resemblance to his novel, Mehmet Akif, in his personal life, was primarily 
known for his strong commitment to Islam, while Mithat Cemal, one of Mehmet 
Akif’s closest friends, lived a secular life, far beyond the beliefs of Mehmet Akif. This 
particular difference, yet, harmony in their friendship will consist the very core of my 
analysis.  
 
In this part of my chapter, I will handle Mehmet Akif as the center of my study, with 
a specific focus on his close relationship with Mithat Cemal.20 My main concern is to 
question the conditions of possibility of consisting a public sphere in the Ottoman 
Empire, by highlighting the difference between Mehmet Akif’s Islamist perspective 
and Mithat Cemal’s secular perspective of life. The contention of this part is to indi-
cate that, even in an Islamic habitus based upon the manners and customs of Shari’a 
and divisions between communities, there used to be a more tolerated atmosphere 
based on a reciprocal consultations and conversations, that, as far as I assume as the 
very point we underestimate regarding our relations in society. 
 
In this respect, I would like to explain my attempt to prefer taking Mehmet Akif as a 
case, following the comments of Cemil Meriç on Mehmet Akif:  
Our ancestors were able to think more brightly than we do. There is no need 
to go any further! You can find the answers to your questions in Mehmet Akif. 
. . . The reason why I embrace Akif as an example is this: Akif was a vigilant 
and progressive Muslim who did not lose sight of any of the problems of his 
age. He saw all the vileness of the society he lived in and comprehended that 
salvation lied in returning to the real Islam. He was a poet. That is, he was 
sincere and honest. . . . Akif is a guide to us who points out the road that seems 
a contradiction to us and must be followed persistently above "inconsisten-
cies." (Meriç, 1986, p 399-400)  
                                                                                                                                                                    
20 They wrote together a poem titled Acem Şahına (For the Persian Shah). 
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3.1.1. The Acquaintance of Mehmet Akif and Mithat Cemal 
Though the friendship Mehmet Akif Ersoy and Mithat Cemal Kuntay should be con-
sidered an exceptionally precious one, I should note that it had not started this way. 
It is important to look at their encounter, the beginning of their relationship, in the 
ways it reveals valuable insight for our concern. The first encounter of Mehmet Akif 
and Mithat Cemal took place in 1903, in İbnülemin Mahmut Kemal’s mansion at 
Beyazıt which used to gather officials, intellectuals, and poets. In this mansion, schol-
arly and political topics were being discussed, and historical, literary books were be-
ing read (Kuntay, 2005, p. 11, 13).  
 
When they first met, Mithat Cemal thought that Mehmet Akif was “a bearded poet,” 
who was against the Tanzimat literature21 and imagined that he was going to talk 
around with nonsense Arabic, and at last, was going to read his gazels and Persian 
beyits. Later, in his monography, he confesses that he waited for Mehmet Akif to read 
his gazels so that he would be able to make fun of him. It was particularly due to the 
arrogance and secular prejudices of Mithat Cemal which made him think that 
Mehmet Akif was an ascetic and an ordinary Ottoman poet. He thought Mehmet Akif 
as “shy Oriental man” (Kuntay, 2005, p. 15, 19).  
 
When Mehmet Akif read his poem for the first time, without knowing that it was 
written by Mehmet Akif, he believed that he was not able to understand this unique 
piece, let alone writing it (Kuntay, 2005, p. 20). All in all, we see how Mithat Cemal’s 
view was dominated by a hegemonic, secularist prejudice that assumes himself su-
perior to Mehmet Akif. At this point, I will continue by mentioning various memories 
as told by Mithat Cemal himself, on how these prejudices were broken down one by 
one afterwards.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
21 The effects of the Tanzimat that brought different genres and styles into the Ottoman lite-
rature. 
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3.1.2. The Prejudices of Mithat Cemal 
Mithat Cemal notes some incidents in his monography, where we deduce that he 
assumed himself superior to Mehmet Akif. With half an eye, it is reasonable to eval-
uate these cases as connected to Mithat Cemal’s personal arrogance and pride, yet, 
with further thought, it becomes more plausible to associate them with more of as a 
result of stereotyped and biased ideas for Muslim person.  
 
One day, during a conversation, Mithat Cemal used a French word “asticot.” When 
he used the word, he felt himself a combination of a linguist, zoologist, and an open-
minded intellectual. He was quite sure that Mehmet Akif did not understand the 
meaning of the word, so, he explained it in Turkish. Simply, for Mithat Cemal, 
Mehmet Akif was not a kind of man who can understand French. Mehmet Akif did 
not say any word; he was all quiet. Then, he left without saying anything. Mithat 
Cemal, relating this with Mehmet Akif’s ignorance, considered Mehmet Akif “a shy 
Oriental man.” Later, he gets surprised by the fact that Mehmet Akif, indeed, was so 
competent in French language, that he was able to distinguish a nuance the word 
contains (Kuntay, 2005, p. 18-19, 21).  
 
Another day, when Mehmet Akif was going to read a French book, Mithat Cemal felt 
bad for Mehmet Akif, thinking that he was going to make a fool of himself. However, 
he realized that he was mistaken when he heard Mehmet Akif’s perfect French ac-
cent. In what follows, he decided to abandon his prejudice, change the way he 
thought about Mehmet Akif, that he was an incapable, ignorant man and began to 
take advantage of his wisdom. Two of them started meeting twice a week and read 
Chataubriand, Lamartine, and Persian poets (Kuntay, 2005, p. 37-38).  
 
Mithat Cemal was not the only one who was mistaken about Mehmet Akif. When 
Cenap Şehabettin saw Mehmet Akif reading Quo Vadis,22 he asked surprisingly; “You 
are reading Quo Vadis! In French. You?” However, Mehmet Akif did not understand 
                                                                                                                                                                    
22 A novel by Henryk Sienkiewicz published in 1895. 
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this reaction. Because reading a French novel was not a big deal for him, as they 
thought (Kuntay, 2005, p. 56).  
 
After Mithat Cemal acknowledges intellectual profundity and the strength of 
Mehmet Akif’s personality, Mithat Cemal defines his inconceivability as follows:  
Both in social life and in art circles, Akif was simply misunderstood. In Fatih, 
he was declared to be a profane, because he used to make fun of “south-
wester prayer” (lodos duası).23 . . . Ziya Gökalp misunderstood that a poem of 
Akif was written to criticize him, this made him an İ’tilâf-ı Hürriyetçi24 in the 
eye of İttihat ve Terakki (Committee of Union and Progress). . . . He did not 
celebrate March 31 incident, so, he was an İ’tilâf-ı Hürriyetçi in the time of 
İ’tilâf-ı Hürriyet (Freedom and Accord Party). . . . He was announced to be a 
blind follower in Şişli because he believed that it meant we would have no 
temple, unless we had freedom. . . .During the Balkan Wars, he frankly reviled 
at the so-called “civilization.” That made him be referred as “primitive” during 
5 o’clock tea parties. . . . He was a snob in coffee houses because he strictly 
criticized the tradition if necessary. . . . Because he believed in religion, he was 
“the man before the flood” in the marketing circles. . . . He was not all happy 
with the blind enthusiasm of the people in the street, which is why he was 
thought to be a man who was inadequate of understanding the concept of 
freedom. . . . Finally, during the truce of World War 1, he was strictly against 
any mandate, he insisted on the idea of “independence,” and independence 
only. So, in the eye of those who supported American mandate, he was not 
even aware of the exploration of America. (Kuntay, 2005, p. 421-423)  
In these examples, it is plausible to see how Mithat Cemal's point of view towards 
Mehmet Akif is shaped in a way that expected to see Mehmet Akif within the bound-
aries of “Oriental man” who could only speak Ottoman Turkish with all his Arabic 
pronunciation.  
 
However, he was capable of understanding French, Arabic and Persian. He was also 
capable enough to admire both East and West literature and knowledge and qualified 
enough to merge the two. He was beyond the stereotypes of secularists, such as 
Mithat Cemal and Cenap Şehabeddin. Furthermore, what distinguishes him from 
Mithat Cemal was that he did not confine himself to a specific doctrine, in this case, 
Islamist doctrine, as Mithat Cemal thought, but rather cultivated his intellectuality 
                                                                                                                                                                    
23 A kind of prayer that is practiced in order to ask from God for a southwester (lodos). 
24 Pro-Freedom and Accord Party (Hürriyet ve İtilâf Fırkası). 
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without considering the restricted perspectives. He was well aware that “knowledge” 
should not be the property of a single class, rather, it should be a shared value by all.  
 
3.1.3. The Muslim Identity of Mehmet Akif 
Islam has been one of the constitutive parts of Mehmet Akif world, both in his per-
sonal and literary life. His Muslim identity was apparently known by everyone, both 
through the way he lived and through the poems he wrote, that he specifically 
grounded on Islamic ideals.  Since Mithat Cemal eliminated his prejudices about 
Mehmet Akif after he acknowledged the value of Mehmet Akif’s intellectual 
knowledge, his Muslim identity has not been a matter of discussion for Mithat Cemal. 
Mehmet Akif was an open-minded Muslim as a hafiz of Qur’an and had committed 
the entire Qur’an to memory. Even though his character and culture were fundamen-
tally shaped by Qur’an, he was also influenced by the positivist schools, that is, after 
studying in one of the newly-emerged high schools İdadi which was followed by Bay-
tar Mektebi (Veterinary School) (Kuntay, 2005, p. 204, 241).  
 
He was able to distinguish religious matters apart from everyday life issues, which 
was a remarkable point to Mithat Cemal. Mehmet Akif’s opinion towards Babanzâde 
Naim reflects his standpoint as well: “Western by ideas, Muslim by heart” (Kuntay, 
2005, p. 143). We also know that Mehmet Akif’s attitude towards modernization pro-
cess was mainly supportive, he believed that the Ottoman Empire should be West-
ernized, but, without losing the national spirit (Kuntay, 2005, p. 274).  
 
After he acknowledged the intellectual profundity and esteemed the lifestyle of 
Mehmet Akif, Mithat Cemal started defending him as well. One day, a man asked 
Mithat Cemal if Mehmet Akif was a religionist, he answered with “But, he distin-
guishes hypocrisy and religion with a secular intelligence (Kuntay, 2005, p. 93). This 
is what makes peculiar Mehmet Akif according to Mithat Cemal: “He is not a Muslim 
of dervish lodge, but a Muslim of mosque” (Kuntay, 2005, p. 269). The down-to-earth 
Islam consideration of Mehmet Akif affected Mithat Cemal and enabled the possibil-
ity to gather them together.  
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However, in his relations with friends from the secular point of view, it was hard to 
observe a case of unconformity, except for a situation where someone was disre-
spectful to his religion. After Tevfik Fikret had written a beyit that insulted Prophet 
Muhammed, Mehmet Akif said: “If he had insulted my father, I would have forgiven 
him. But insulting my prophet... I would better die than to tolerate it (Kuntay, 2005, 
p. 124). This manner was Mehmet Akif’s main principle with respect to his under-
standing of religion.  His reaction to a similar incident was to say: “Anyone can wor-
ship to the sun or to fire. I don’t get involved with the God or prophet of anyone. 
However, no one can mess with mine, either!” (Kuntay, 2005, p. 30). Though he was 
an open-minded Muslim, he had strict limits of his own, and he was well known for 
his clear stance for what he believed.  
 
3.1.4. The Humbleness and Tolerance of Mehmet Akif 
It can be said that Mehmet Akif’s another peculiarity was his humbleness. His friend 
Ömer Ferit Bey,25 whom Mehmet Akif used to love so much, did not like the poems 
of Mehmet Akif. Yet, Mehmet Akif did not consider it an issue or tended to take it 
personally. Instead, he said: “Is it possible for a man, who is capable of understanding 
Mevlana and Lamartine, could not understand the poem?” Besides this ethical con-
duct, he was not a man who would abstain from calling out the right, if necessary. If 
he felt that a man seeked for a voice of debate during the conversation, Mehmet Akif 
did not hesitate to object any essential opinion of him. If you were to use an improper 
voice, that could have been directed, only to his poems. Even if one had these objec-
tions with a joky manner, he could still listen carefully, believing that he could take 
advantage of him (Kuntay, 2005, p. 291-292).  
 
There are some examples, which Mehmet Akif criticized his poet friend in his poems, 
due to their lifestyles, yet, even this did not let them fall apart. Their gatherings were 
grounded on the literary critique and interpretation, which was based upon toler-
ance. Furthermore, he also had close ties with the bohemian poet Neyzen Tevfik who 
was famous with his drunkenness and taught Mehmet Akif ney while he was teaching 
                                                                                                                                                                    
25 Ömer Ferit Kâm was a professor in Darülfünûn. 
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him French, Arabic and Persian (Kuntay, 2005, p. 228; Edip, 1962, p. 350) What should 
be highlighted is that humbleness and tolerance are also key factors of being com-
patible with.  
 
3.1.5. The Silence of Mehmet Akif 
One of the most salient characteristics of Mehmet Akif was his silence, as Mithat 
Cemal stresses:  
There were 6-7 silence types of Akif: 
1. A never-ending silence (In case he was not pleased by the man he met) 
2. An insulting silence (In cases when someone talked in a way that disagreed 
with his belief) 
3. A nice silence (While a person is reading one of his pieces) 
4. A silence with worship (While listening to a musical work) 
5. An intelligent silence (While someone is narrating something) 
6. A deeming silence (If someone attempted to backbite someone) 
7. A shaming silence (If someone was talking about a case that he did not ac-
tually know, but in a manner that he pretended to know). (Kuntay, 2005, p. 
299)  
Similarly, the first encounter of Mehmet Akif and Mithat Cemal Kuntay, after the 
gathering in İbnülemin Mahmut Kemal’s mansion, Mithat Cemal read a poem of his 
own to Mehmet Akif, and Mehmet Akif just kept his silence (Kuntay, 2005, p. 15). 
Another time, Mithat Cemal defines one of his debate with Mehmet Akif as “Single 
words after long pauses of silence…” (Kuntay, 2005, p. 112). Furthermore, Mehmet 
Akif, while he was next to Ömer Ferit Bey did not used to talk in order to maintain the 
joy of listening to him. As Kuntay stresses, the main reason for his silence was training 
himself of not getting involved in something, which he does not know properly 
(Kuntay, p. 102, 147, 376). Mehmet Akif’s silence does not only say a lot about his 
personality and moral standing but, should also be emphasized in the way it suggests 
a valuable road map regarding the possibility of generating a public.  
 
Silence, in general, tends to be evaluated as a lack of interest. However, in the case 
of Mehmet Akif, silence implies a variety of meanings, such as approval, disregard, 
and contemplation. Silence, as far as I suggest, is a condition of possibility in order to 
consist a public. It is also the very point that makes it possible for Mehmet Akif to 
maintain his relations with other people.  
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In the next part of my chapter, I will try to draw a general frame, revealing the drives 
of the gatherings and friendships in the 19th century Ottoman Empire. In order to 
avoid possible voids, I intend to mention the establishment and cultural habitus of 
Young Ottomans briefly. Then I will particularly put an emphasis on the formation of 
the public sphere in Ottoman Era by keeping my main focus on the circumstances in 
which Ottoman intellectuals were motivated. As Habermasian sense of the concept 
suggests, I will follow the traces of the public sphere in the coffee houses, coffee 
shops and the mansions.  
 
3.2. A 19th-Century Panorama of the Ottoman Empire 
The 19th century was an enriching epoch for the Ottoman Empire on the skids in 
which they have made progress socially, culturally, and politically. However, one 
should note that these reforms were not limited to the state sponsored attempts.  
Young Ottomans, who can be considered the ancestors of the intellectuals like 
Mehmet Akif, and their improvements are worth considering in this sense. My main 
concern is to question the public sphere in the Ottoman Empire by reflecting the 
changes in which it passed through. To stretch the issue of the public sphere even 
further, the history of the emerging public spheres from the 16th century to the 20th 
century and the gatherings of intellectuals will be discussed in order to deliberate 
whether the public sphere exists in the Turkish academy or not which I will pin as an 
ontological matter in modern Turkey.  
 
Embodying different nations, religions, and cultures, the Ottomans were one of the 
most multiethnic empires compared to its contemporaries. Even though this quality 
of the Ottoman Empire –inherited by Turkey as well– generated a broad-based struc-
ture, this mixt nature left it and its subjects hanging in between the Asian and Euro-
pean cultures and blurred Turkey’s perception of the West and the East. While in the 
Ottoman Empire this feeling of being in-between took effect in the 19th century, Tur-
key experienced it since its foundation as a heritage which is clearly associated with 
Islam. Since the foundation of the Republic of Turkey, Islam, the backbone of the cul-
tural environment in the Ottoman Empire (which perished in time), has been consid-
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ered an obstacle on the road to revolutionizing the country and has been thus tar-
geted by the founders of the nascent republic —a point which will consist one of the 
core aspects of my argumentation.  
 
I should note that I do not aim to portrait the Ottoman Empire as an ideal state, yet I 
want to emphasize this cultural possibility of the encounters in the public sphere. 
That is, my subject matter or main argumentation does not necessarily suggest that 
the Ottoman Empire had the ideal administrative structures and apparatuses as if 
creating the only possible ways of political atmosphere and intersections. Instead, I 
would like to trace the basic occasions which were specific to the Ottomans, regard-
ing public discussions. In the proceeding parts, I will question the historical back-
grounds which enabled diversity of public sphere types, such as the Mehmet Akif and 
Mithat Cemal’s.  
 
3.2.1. The Modernization Initiatives 
The Ottoman Empire stayed out of the Western European intellectual mainstream by 
the mid-19th century (Mardin, 2000, p. 8). After admitting that they lost power con-
siderably in the past centuries, the Ottoman Empire confessed that it was now infe-
rior to European countries in almost every area of competition. Even though there 
were some objections, the government agreed that the key to catching up with the 
Europe lied in taking serious measures. The first attempt, to prevent the lack of infor-
mation about the European doctrines, was sending Yirmi Sekiz Mehmet Çelebi26 as 
the first envoy to France in 1720, which, in time, turned into a periodical routine 
(Akyüz, 2016, p.5). Permanent Ottoman embassies in Western countries commenced 
the epoch of shaping the Tanzimat (the Reorganization) according to the Western 
model (Mardin, 1994, p. 10, 11), both culturally and politically. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
26 The effect of Yirmi Sekiz Mehmet Çelebi’s visit can also be seen in 1726 in the sense of first 
Ottoman printing press (Mardin, 2000, p. 137) which was co-established by his son, 
Yirmisekiz Çelebizâde Said. 
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Nizam-ı Cedid27 (the New Order) (1795), Sened-i İttifak28 (the Charter of Alliance) 
(1808) and the abolishment of the Janissaries (1826) were the reflections of progress 
into a modern centralized state and modernization reforms (Mardin, 2000, p. 145-
147). This process triggered the establishment of various new social groups, a modern 
state, and a process of nationalization (Karpat, 2014, p. 57). Furthermore, some gov-
ernmental institutions such as Takvîm-i Vekâyi (the Official Gazette), the postal sys-
tem, police department and new ministries (Mardin, 2000, p. 151, 155) were the pre-
cursors of Hatt-ı Hümâyun-ı Gülhane (the Imperial Rescript of Gülhane).  
 
3.2.2. The Formal Calls of the Ottoman Empire 
The Imperial Rescript of Gülhane (1839), the Islahat Hatt-ı Hümayûn (1856) and the 
Ottoman Constitution (1876) could be defined as the official calls from the Ottoman 
Empire to survive. The Imperial Rescript of Gülhane was the first formal call of the 
Ottoman Empire to bring its subjects together (Mardin, 2000, p. 173), generated the 
epoch of reforms. It was an urgent need in order “to establish the basis for the even-
tual creation of an Ottoman nation in which subjects would benefit from identical 
civil rights, automatically conferred with citizenship and not dependent on religious 
affiliation” (Mardin, 2000, p. 14, 162).  
 
The second precaution taken by the state, following The Imperial Rescript of Gülhane, 
was the declaration of the Islâhat Hatt-ı Hümâyûn (the Imperial Rescript of Reform). 
Through this proclamation, the Ottoman Empire was declaring that Muslims were no 
longer privileged compared to non-Muslims, and was trying to establish an “Ottoman 
citizenship” without discrimination on the basis of religion, which was a boon to the 
non-Muslim subjects and foreigners (Mardin, 1994, p. 14). Extending the scope of the 
conception of citizenship while restricting the powers of the sultan, the call of the 
Ottoman Empire meant that it recognized its subjects without exception as citizens 
for the first time (Mardin, 2000, p. 157, 169).  
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
27 A military corps founded by Sultan Selim III. 
28 A charter signed between the landed proprietors and the Ottoman Empire in the time of 
Mahmud II. 
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The Imperial Rescript of Gülhane has direct effects on the efforts through constitu-
tionalism and popular representation. Following the Imperial Rescript and its adjust-
ments, the foreign language press within the Ottoman Empire started discussing con-
stitutionalism and stirred up the Young Ottomans. In 1867, Mustafa Fazıl Paşa29 wrote 
an open letter to the sultan –which, being copied 50,000 times and distributed all 
around the capital, sparked outrage– relating the fate of the Ottoman Empire with 
the absence of constitutionalism (Mardin, 2000, p. 31-32, 38).  
 
Sultan Abdülhamid II, sensing the danger of the Young Ottoman movement, founded 
a constitutional committee in October 1876. However, as a result of the Sultan’s grad-
ual opposition to the constitution, the parliament was suspended in 1876, and there-
fore the end of the Young Ottoman movement was accelerated as well (Mardin, 
2000, p. 77-78).  Even though it might be considered to be the end of an era, Mardin 
(2000) assesses the contributions of the Young Ottomans as follows:  
Their permanent contribution, on the other hand, was the establishment of a 
climate of opinion wherein discussions centered around such conceptions as 
that of "liberty" and "the fatherland" became widespread and gained in-
creased momentum despite Abdülhamid's censorship. This was no mean in-
tellectual legacy. (p. 80)  
To summarize, although the reforms seemed to be introduced in governmental and 
military issues, they were not yet sufficiently interiorized ones. Young Ottomans, in-
evitably, took action in order to prevent the fall of the Ottoman Empire and attain 
freedom.   
 
3.3. The Young Ottomans 
The Young Ottomans were a group of Ottoman intellectuals who were the first orga-
nized group that politically protested against the Ottoman Empire and the governors. 
They sought to revive the state from their own perspective. They thought that the 
reforms had to be carried out rather in realms such as education and culture than in 
governmental issues. They spent great effort to modernize the Ottoman Empire in a 
                                                                                                                                                                    
29 Grandchild of Kavalalı Mehmet Ali Paşa. He was a bureaucrat. However, in time he became 
the leader of opponents, the first time he gathered with the opponents was in his mansion, 
later gatherings were held in Paris. 
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European sense and to have a constitution while preserving its essentials. Acting as 
the brain of the Turkish reading public, they came to the fore by way of their intellec-
tual equipment and strived to establish a synthesis between Islam and these modern 
ideas which were inherited by Muslim intellectuals, such as Mehmet Akif.  
 
At every level of modernization –from the simplification of the written language to 
the idea of fundamental civil liberties– the influence of the Young Ottomans could be 
observed. They propagated their ideas with the help of the mass media (Mardin, 
2000, p. 3-4). They defended the idea that having a parliament was vital in order to 
achieve the freedom they desired, following this, they were convinced on the idea 
that the “absolute rule should be transformed into constitutional rule."30  
 
3.3.1. The Cultural Habitus the Young Ottomans Inherited 
The 19th century Ottoman Empire’s cultural environment was mainly surrounded by 
a condition of backwardness. Until the mid-19th century, translation of the works of 
European philosophers, novelists, and thinkers were very limited whereas transla-
tions of Islamic literature and philosophy were abundant in the Ottoman Empire. This 
led them to the belief that clinging to the past of was necessary in order to survive. 
However, they also defended the idea of benefiting from Europe’s cultural heritage 
(Mardin, 2000, p. 133, 203) which induced them to combine these two poles. 
 
Their common ground was to have a broad “knowledge of European civilization and 
an equal concern at the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire” which had a strict 
connection with their background in the Translation Bureau of the Porte (Mardin, 
2000, p. 11; Mardin, 1994, p. 58). In what followed, the French men of letters entered 
and consequently widened the spectrum of Western literature translations in the Ot-
toman Empire (Mardin, 2000, p. 194-195). All in all, the fact that the Young Ottomans 
merged their cultural habitus with the intellectual capitals of Europe put its imprint 
on the actions of the Young Ottomans.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
30 Ebüzziya Tevfik, "Yeni Osmanlılar," Yeni Tasvir-i Efkar, June 7, 1909, p. 3. 
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3.4. The Formation of the Public Sphere in the Ottoman Empire 
My claim here is to mark the public sphere, in the way Habermas uses the term, as 
the medium of critique and, as the center for the information flow. Having presented 
the idea within the limits of our concern, I intend to offer that public sphere as a 
concept had existed in the Ottoman Empire even before it did in the West, within the 
period ushered by coffee shops and mansions. However, it has to be noted that it 
was not an institutionalized structure as it is in Europe, and it significantly differs from 
the European case, since the main constitutive element in Ottoman era was not the 
bourgeois class, but the intellectuals. In this part, I will try to present the circum-
stances, in which the public sphere was constructed in Ottoman Era. I will first give 
the historical background focusing on the reinforcements provided by the Translation 
Bureau, the function of the press in the ways each precipitated the phases public 
sphere passed through.  
 
A bourgeois class or a civil society in the European sense barely existed in the Otto-
man Empire (Mardin, 1992, p. 106), which was mostly due to the strict non-stratifi-
cation policy of the state and its control over social mobility to maintain the status 
quo (Karpat, 2014, p. 34; Mardin, 1992, p. 121, 131). However, the development of 
new technologies and increasing gold circulation stemming from the newly emerging 
trade routes led to new forms of social stratification (Karpat, 2014, p. 34). Still, it is 
certain that the merchant class of the Ottomans was far from contributing to the 
creation of a public sphere in the European sense because of the aforementioned 
state policy of the Ottoman Empire and the resulting lack of political privilege of the 
merchants as opposed to the European example (Mardin, 1992, p. 116, 130). Seen in 
this light, I claim that there is not a bourgeois class in the Ottoman Empire, but an 
intellectual class as the founder of the public sphere.  
 
Şerif Mardin (1990, p. 27) suggests that the public sphere in the Ottoman Empire 
emerged in the 1860s in the period shaped by Tanzimat reforms, along with the ef-
forts bureaucrats put effectively, in order to stir public opinion by means of press. 
What made public opinion more vivid and effective in the Tanzimat era, based upon 
the process that started with a series of historical developments, could be noted in 
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the following: The establishment of a modern education system which came on the 
front burner in Tanzimat and of a new communication system (telegraph), and fol-
lowed by the private press ownership in early the 1860s (Georgeon, 1999, p. 71).  
 
The 19th century has been the renaissance era of the Ottoman Empire. Firstly, it de-
cided to consult community leaders for their advice, for the first time in history. This 
basically signifies that, for the first time in Ottoman history, the state opinion is 
opened up for a different perspective. In addition, the Constitution of 1876 and the 
new parliament opened up new perspectives for the Ottoman Empire, by involving 
the subjects into the public sphere. Though, in the end, the Parliament was abolished; 
it was an important stage in the constitution of the public sphere in Ottoman Empire 
because the folks were much more motivated to involve the public than before (Kar-
pat, 2014, p. 134, 142). These are the significant developments that can be inter-
preted as the first kernels of public opinion in the Ottoman Empire, all of which offer 
a significant place for the idea of the public sphere in the Ottoman society.  
 
Even though these developments did not suffice to constitute a public, in the broader 
sense, created a boomerang effect. The public sphere in the Ottoman Empire, in the 
first place, emerged as an effort for survival for the Ottoman Empire, by the very 
effort that the Ottoman Empire itself put. In what follows, the public, when breathed 
the freedom and became aware of their capacity, irrepressibly had a motivation of 
creating a public sphere and public opinion.  
 
3.4.1. The Translation Bureau 
Since the extent of connections between the Ottoman Empire and the West –in the 
19th century– have increased, the need for a systematic interpretation augmented 
because of a diplomatic requirement, such as performing international correspond-
ence and educational concerns. In order to fill this void, the Ottoman Empire founded 
a new unit, called Translation Bureau in the Porte, in 1822 in which almost all of the 
Young Ottomans’ career have been crossed with as a clerk, such as Namık Kemal, 
İbrahim Şinasi and Mehmet Bey. Especially since the 1840's, the bureau undertook 
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an important task (Mardin, 2000, p. 207-208) which functioned sort of a university 
both in lingual and cultural sense as a precursor of gatherings in the Ottoman Empire.  
 
3.4.2. The Newspapers 
For the Ottoman Empire, literature did not only serve as cultural means but also per-
formed political purposes as well. Literature had sometimes been a medium to praise 
the Sultan and the State, by Divan Literature who addressed to their limited strata 
and therefore the communication pattern was restricted (Mardin, 1994, p. 147). It 
was not only because of not addressing the subjects and also because of its pompous 
language. Furthermore, it did not pursue a purpose of providing information or af-
fecting the masses by means of literature which will be the task of newspaper later 
on.  
 
Takvîm-i Vekâyi, Cerîde-i Havâdis, Tercümân-ı Ahvâl, and Tasvîr-i Efkâr were im-
portant attempts to expand the communication patterns to wider strata. Şinasi 
played a central role in Tasvir-i Efkâr, in order to stir questioning the thinking among 
thepublic which supposed social and political issues should only concern the states-
men, not the public. Newspaper, in the hands of Şinasi, became an apparatus of prop-
agating information around European intellectuals and of going beyond the Ottoman 
literature’s classical molds (Mardin, 2000, p. 254; Kuzucu, 2011, p. 165).  
 
His principle, prioritizing to use a clear language, and his essential care for the right 
of access to information, increased the literacy level in the Ottoman Empire (Mardin, 
2000, p. 265; Mardin, 1994, p. 96). Following the newspaper’s essential aim, every 
topic was to be reached to the public (Mardin, 1994, p. 168-171), since it is believed 
that what concerns the state, should also concern the public. In this regard, the press 
operated significantly to make citizens be aware of their political subjectivity.  
 
One of the major contributions of newspapers was the dissemination of the news and 
information that were coming around from the West. In this period, the newspapers, 
such asTasvir-i Efkâr, Muhbir, Hürriyet and İbret, remained at the center as an appa-
ratus for Young Ottomans to criticize the policies of the Ottoman Empire. The history 
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of Young Ottomans had a strong tie with the development of Ottoman journalism, 
the protests of the Young Ottomans and their dissemination of journalistic move-
ment by changing their tone from didactic to politic and argumentative (Mardin, 
2000, p. 80, 244, 256). Young Ottomans, by virtue of the press, publicized the 
knowledge, paved the way of public critique through their educational articles, and 
at last, formed a public to address, to direct.  
 
3.5. The Public Sphere Types in the Ottoman Empire 
3.5.1. The Coffee Houses 
Even though the general idea among scholars states that the public sphere as a 
proper social entity has started with the occurrence of coffee houses, various schol-
ars offer the mosques, pubs (meyhâne), and bozahânes31 could also be evaluated as 
elements of the public sphere. Each of these places had their own exclusive group of 
guests, meaning that each one addressed a limited segment of the community. On 
the contrary, coffee houses were exceptionally encompassing among their conge-
neric spaces, in the way that they gathered people from almost every segment and 
strata of the society together (Kömeçoğlu, p. 51).  
 
The first coffee house in the Ottoman Empire (1555), has opened up new horizons, 
in the sense that it precipitated socialization in public. The coffee houses did not aim 
to represent either a religious, or secular characteristic, and they were located in the 
central spaces, such as Ayasofya, Beyazıt, Divanyolu, and Direklerarası (Georgeon, 
1999, p. 58). So that, they made easier to reach broader masses and to address a 
wider range of people. Specifically owing to their freedom-based nature, coffee 
houses aimed to be inviting for every person in the community, without regarding, 
either any limits or classification or caring the ethnicity or religion (Smyrnelis, 2000, 
p. 219), when compared the narrower nature of theaters and salons as targeting the 
elites. Especially the ones which intersected Jews, Armenian, Greek and Muslim dis-
tricts were the most cosmopolites (Georgeon, p. 1999, 54).  
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
31 A place where boza is made and drunk. 
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Another noteworthy contribution of the coffee houses was how they change the 
codes of socialization in the Ottoman Empire. Before the coffee houses came to the 
fore, everyday life in the Ottoman society was basically between home-mosque-ba-
zaar (Işın, 1995, p. 386-387). Along with their emergence, coffee houses did not only 
serve as regular gathering places but played a significant role in the way that they 
offer a strong form of new socialization. Coffee houses functioned “…as a principal 
institution of a public sphere, a channel and site of public communication, and as an 
area linking the socio-cultural with the political” (Kömeçoğlu, 2005, p. 6). Coffee 
houses undertook the task of “interspace” due to its nature of gathering those who 
governed and those who were governed (Öztürk, 2006, p. 103) which stirred a shared 
language. In these places, political issues were an issue of topic, which merged the 
everyday life experience and the authoritarian powers (Kömeçoğlu, 2009, p. 56). 
 
However, they have been perceived as a threat to the Ottoman Empire,32 and there 
have been times of bans due to their potential of producing political rumors which 
especially in semi-literate societies is the easiest way of stirring the masses (Toros, 
1998, p. 33; Öztürk, 2006, p. 103). They also have eased the expansion of the nar-
rower information network in the Ottoman Empire. Furthermore, especially with the 
coffee houses of Janissaries, the entrance of Janissaries into the everyday life became 
possible which overstepped the strict stratification policy of the Ottoman Empire 
(Sankır, 2010, p. 203). Since then, coffee houses have been branded as an “evil 
hearth” which supported the humbleness and bad habits and provided a basis for an 
organization against the Ottoman Empire (Birsel, 1975, p. 13). This was because the 
state wanted to maintain its absolutism and prevent the violation of status quo 
(Sankır, 2010, p. 199) which they feared of blurring the difference between the ruling 
elites and the subjects.  
 
The coffee shops used to function as a source of news and information which gath-
ered the news from the all sides of the Ottoman Empire (Georgeon, 1999, p. 48). 
Mainly, in the time of repressions, they have been the only source of news (as cited 
                                                                                                                                                                    
32 Especially in the time of Abdülhamid II, coffee shops were followed closely by spies and 
informants (Kuzucu, 2011, p. 202). 
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in Işın, 1995, p. 67) which disseminated more authentic and current news when com-
pared to the formal language and content of newspapers (Kırlı, 2009, p. 95). It be-
came a major engine, in time, to promulgate a discourse against regime and the cor-
ruption (Sankır, 2010, p. 201) turned coffee houses into place of struggle, sometimes 
to the state, sometimes for the state and sometimes between the state and the soci-
ety in order to agree (Tutal, 2014, p. 157). Young Ottomans, who politicized the func-
tion of coffee houses, used to meet in coffee houses before the exile in 1867, in order 
to exchange their ideas and reevaluate the current events (Georgeon, 1999, p. 73, 
76).  
 
The activities of Karagöz (shadow theater), public storytellers, which were performed 
in the coffee houses, could also be given as examples to the public critiques in the 
performative sense (Ortaylı, 2000, p. 115; Ercins, 2013, p. 305) which used to inform 
the audience about the political rumors and critiques (Sankır, 2010, p. 196). These 
were the indications of how the critique could increase the radius of its action, not 
only at the discursive level but at theatrical and performative level as well.  
 
Even though playing chess and backgammon were daily routines of coffee shops 
(Ayvazoğlu, 2011, p. 121), the involvement of coffee shops to provide a basis for lit-
erary activities through gathering the men of letters cannot be underestimated. Es-
pecially at nights, under the guidance of men of letters, coffee houses embraced and 
discussed the topics from literature to mathematics, and from politics to sociology 
(Tutal, 2014, p. 159). With its nature of introducing, reading, and criticizing literary 
works into the public (Anar, 2012, p. 76), it had sort of “academy” function (Safa, 
2003, p. 95) Another common trait which could be seen in coffee shops was reading 
aloud, such as, manuscript, newspapers, books (Birsel, 1975, p. 42; Kuzucu, 2011, p. 
164; Sökmen, 2011, p. 31). Some gained the role of publishing and a bookstore 
(Gerçek, 1997, p. 70-71) which especially after the Era of Abdülaziz, started distin-
guishing by their cultural activities and turned into coffee houses (Kuzucu, 2011, p. 
164).  
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3.5.2. The Coffee Shops 
Coffee shops followed a similar path with coffee houses with regard to their mutual 
function of gathering people together. Yet, they provided a more intellectual atmos-
phere. It was an appealing characteristic of the coffee shop that, conversations cov-
ered a diverse scale encompassing philosophy, literature, daily politics, and so on. 
Sarafim Kıraathanesi was one of the most prominent cultural centers between the 
years 1881 and 1907 and hosted a vast number of poets and intellectuals. Also, it had 
its own library and publications, where supplied books for Abdülhamid II, upon his 
orders. Due to its central location, people from different strata, such as statesmen, 
high-ranking officials, literary men and people from the public, had the opportunity 
to gather. Namık Kemal, Ebüzziya Tevfik, and Muallim Naci were some of the quests 
of this coffee shop throughout its presence (Georgeon, 1999, p. 60; Anar, 2012, p. 
207, 210-211).  
 
Another remarkable one, İkbal Kıraathanesi, provided gathering opportunity for 
Yahya Kemal and his students, who used the shop to manage the administration of 
the literary journal Dergâh. İkbal also became a popular place for professors from 
Darülfünûn (House of Multiple Sciences), and for future writers, who would publish 
their works in the Republic Era (Ayvazoğlu, 2011, p. 177, 179). Meserret Kıraathanesi, 
which actively served both in Ottoman and Republic Era, brought together various 
names such as Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar, Necip Fazıl Kısakürek and Sezai Karakoç (Anar, 
2012, p. 214-221).  
 
As the last one, I will mention Marmara Kıraathanesi, which succeeded to provide a 
ground as tolerant and welcoming as its other counterparts, did not regard any divi-
sion among its guests. It placed particular importance for, traditional chatting culture, 
for an environment where each person acted respectfully towards another's beliefs, 
and to provide a ground for a different point of views to be able to speak freely (Anar, 
2012, p. 262).   
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3.5.3. Private Gatherings in Mansions and Houses 
Private discussion groups, which can be dated far back, well-known in the Ottoman 
intellectual world, significantly for their literary characteristic. The first informal in-
teraction between Ottoman intellectuals and the Western intellectual world took 
place in a salon called Beşiktaş Scientific Society, a seaside mansion that belonged to 
Ismail Ferruh Efendi. Main topics of this gatherings were literature, philosophy, math-
ematics, and astronomy. Members of this place were in touch with foreign scholars, 
and they read books and letters of these scholars in meetings.  
 
To arrange gatherings in mansions was one of the main constituents of the Ottoman 
intellectual life. These types of gatherings were much more favorable for those who 
can be defined as an introvert, those who particularly chose desolate streets to walk 
(Kuntay, 2005, p. 17), like Mehmet Akif (Okay, 2005, p. 33), than the ones held in 
public spaces.33 At this point, it is noteworthy to mention that the first time Mehmet 
Akif and Mithat Cemal met was in one of these gatherings, in a mansion (of İbnülemin 
Mahmut Kemal) in 1903 (Kuntay, 2005, p. 14). This group of gatherings was one of 
the preliminary conditions of the public sphere in the Habermasian sense.  
 
In Sultan Abdülaziz reign, almost every household who had a large mansion used to 
host an educated man at his residence. That is, the owner sponsored and encouraged 
this man to work on his intellectual interests. The mansions and houses were places 
for gatherings and centers for education (Anar, 2010, p. 91-94), which became the 
prominent centers of discussion, and unsurprisingly eased the Young Ottoman move-
ment due to their educational, and cultural functions. Meetings and debates held in 
these mansions were pivotal in the sense that they imported Western cultural herit-
age through cultural and educational debates (Mardin, 2000, p. 232-233).  
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
33 Even though, in his poem Berlin Hatıraları (Berlin Memories), he noted that he appreciated 
the coffee shops of Berlin, we know that he did not think the same way about Turkish coffee 
shops, based on his sayings in his poem Mahalle Kahvesi (District Coffee shop). We have the 
information that, instead, he preferred going to the Teahouse of İsmail. 
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The mansion of İbnülemin Mahmut Kemal, who was a Nakşi follower bureaucrat, bi-
ographer and a scholar, has been a gathering place for 80 years.  They held gather-
ings, which mainly placed the music to the center. Along with this, guests talked 
about literature and had debates on current political issues. İbnülemin hosted many 
statesmen, poets, writers, journalists (Toros, 1992, p. 36; Anar, 2012, p. 161-171). 
Şair Nigar (Poet Nigar), in her mansion, hosted many writers, poets and politics as 
well. His gatherings on Tuesdays were the first European-styled salon gatherings, and 
they were exclusive for those who were invited privately (Anar, 2012, p. 121).  
 
İctihad Evi, an administration office and a house of Abdullah Cevdet Paşa, also played 
an important role literary and politically (Anar, 2012, p. 145-153). The mansion of 
Abdurrahman Sami Paşa, father of Sami Paşazade Sezai, was a place for discussions 
on various topics (Anar, 2012, p. 98), especially debates on political issues. Insomuch 
that, Namık Kemal’s first hearing about the idea of revolution in the European sense, 
took place in that very mansion (Anar, 2012, p. 101; Kuntay, 1944, 293). Abdülhak 
Hamid guested a variety of people from Cenap Şehabettin to Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, 
Mithat Cemal in his house (Anar, 2012, p. 174-175). On the agenda, there were mem-
ories of old literature, his journeys, historical events and daily events (Toros, 1992, p. 
51).  
 
3.6. Conclusion 
In this chapter, basing my argument upon the friendship of Mehmet Akif Ersoy and 
Mithat Cemal Kuntay and taking one of their gatherings in the apartment of Mithat 
Cemal as a case, I have tried to reflect the conditions of possibility of the public 
sphere, in the Habermasian sense. In this gathering, we observe a cultural interaction 
and discussion in which they read and talk about their pieces without seeking any 
hierarchy. Taking this gathering specifically is to reflect that along with a sharp con-
trast between Mithat Cemal, Abdülhak Hamid, Sami Paşazade Sezai and Mehmet 
Akif, a public sphere has been generated.  
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From this point of view, I put an emphasis on the friendship of Mehmet Akif Ersoy, as 
he represents the Muslim pole, and Mithat Cemal, as he marks the secular pole. Fol-
lowing this difference, I aim to investigate the conditions of possibilities in their 
friendship, by getting benefit of the monography of Mehmet Akif written by Mithat 
Cemal.  
 
When they first met in the mansion of İbnülemin Mahmut Kemal in 1903, their rela-
tionship started as surrounded by the domination of Mithat Cemal Kuntay’s preju-
dices and stereotypes towards Mehmet Akif. As Kuntay would expect, Mehmet Akif 
should be narrow-minded, Orientalist bigot. However, Mehmet Akif proved that he 
was far beyond Mithat Cemal’s biased vision, with his intellectual capability of merg-
ing the Western knowledge and the Eastern heritage. Once he admitted Mehmet 
Akif’s depth and competence, their friendship was moved on an intellectual basis.  
In my opinion, what has eliminated the possible problems regarding the antagonism 
between Mehmet Akif and Mithat Cemal Kuntay was tolerance. Though the fact that 
Mehmet Akif had his explicit limits with respect to religious issues, this did not nec-
essarily mean that he was an uncompromising, unbridgeable person in his environ-
ment. It was more than possible to establish a ground of discussion, agreement and 
friendship with Mehmet Akif unless his explicit principles were violated in a way.  
 
Thus, his friends were not the variation of a prototype, yet, he had various friends 
from a wide range of classes, backgrounds and ideologies. The single determinative 
point was that they could meet with the understanding that the basis of each rela-
tionship is tolerance and intellectuality. Mehmet Akif’s humility and silence were, in 
particular, what made him precious for Mithat Cemal. Specifically, Mehmet Akif’s si-
lence was so significant for Mithat Cemal that he highlighted in his monography by 
various means. As Mithat Cemal tells, Mehmet Akif’s types of silence were varied 
with regard to each situation, but all of them used to signify valuable, ethical insights. 
To remind the public sphere theory of Jürgen Habermas, I should mention that the 
main principles to establish a public sphere are; to form a basis that postulates equal-
ity among all members, to provide opportunity for a free debate, and create a com-
50 
mon ground that can gather people regardless of how different they are, in compar-
ison to one another. I should also remind that Hannah Arendt associates the public 
with her table analogy that is, how a table gathers, yet, separates the people around 
it at the same time.  
 
To my understanding, Mehmet Akif Ersoy, by courtesy of his silence, fulfills a remark-
able void. I tend to evaluate the state of silence through how a society’s unity resem-
bles a musical piece, that is, a musical piece would be nothing but a chaos without 
the pauses between the notes. In the same way, in society, silence should be re-
garded as equally essential as talking, if not more. Without knowing to know where 
one should talk or stop, it would only be total chaos, inside everyone keeps talking. 
Silence is a determinative attitude that sustains a dialogue, a ground for communica-
tion and an essential component to consist a public, which passes by the tolerance.  
 
Undoubtedly, we cannot take this period as an absolute, single-layered example of 
the Ottoman Empire and reduce it to a monotypic structure. However, I firmly believe 
that people in the Ottoman society sought for the difference between politics and 
took the humanity, literature and importance of idea as a common denominator. 
Though they did not fit into the terms of the public sphere in the Habermasian sense, 
each of these groups and gatherings, provided a common ground for people from 
various classes, beliefs and environments. Having created an atmosphere through 
debate and tolerance, each gathering served a significant role in society, in a way that 
increased the level of culture. What I observe here, is that such an attitude is some-
thing we have lost since then which I will highlight in the next chapter, and such a 
ground does not exist in today’s society anymore.  
 
 I suggest that the collapse of the possibility of public is deep-rooted which had to be 
searched in the republican era. Turkey, as the residue of the Ottoman Empire, is in 
between, through a period which started with Tanzimat, and appropriated by the 
Republic, has failed without trying to bridge the East and the West, and to consist an 
amalgam. When compared to the mixed nature of the Ottoman Empire, the Republic 
of Turkey preferred a stereotyped, homogenized, ideologically conflicted society. 
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With the Republic, coding the secularism with the denial of the Islam, they also have 
denied the past with Islam and its proceeds. In the next chapter, I will try to reflect 
this radical shift in Turkish history and social life. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
52 
 
CHAPTER 4 
THE COLLAPSE OF THE PUBLIC AND THE ACADEMY IN TURKEY 
 
“…for everything is so bound up with every-
thing else, that to want to exclude some-
thing means to exclude everything.”  
–Nietzsche 
 
In this last chapter of my thesis, I will suggest that the public (sphere) encountered a 
collapse beginning with the late Ottoman and early republican era. In this chapter, I 
will discuss the ways in which Islam was considered one of the major threats in the 
republican era, and the policies that were implemented against this “major threat.” 
In addition, I will consider secularism, positivism, and the Kemalist elites as the sup-
porting elements of this period. Then, I will try to elaborate the conditions of possi-
bilities of the public (sphere) in Turkey, focusing on intellectual communities in par-
ticular. Finally, I will try to show how polarization with regard to the hegemonic na-
ture of the intellectual-academic sphere was triggered and constricted the (condi-
tions of possibilities of) the public and its extensions.  
 
The incipient Republic of Turkey mapped out a tenet of secularism by reducing soci-
ety to a homogenized structure and deploying itself as the absolute. Even though its 
reforms were rational consequences of the pro-laic ideas of the Young Ottomans, the 
reforms and restrictions of Atatürk went beyond their laic policies by penetrating not 
only the institutional and juridical level but also and especially the lives of citizens 
(Zürcher, 2002, p. 48).  
 
The laicism in the Turkish case was a radical one, positioning itself in opposition to 
traditionalism and Islam (Yeğen, 2002, p. 57-58), which used to be one of the chief 
elements of the Ottoman Empire. Since its foundation, the main concern of the Re-
public of Turkey was centered on Islam in a way that re-created laicism into the fore-
most issue and Muslims as one of the constitutive Others of the Republic of Turkey. 
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In this othering process, the republican elites were the bearers, by way of a series of 
apparatuses such as laicism, positivism, and Westernization.  
 
4.1. Islam as the Hostis of the Republic of Turkey 
Islam, due to being the legitimizer of the ancient regime (Cangızbay, 2008, p. 148) 
and a “mediator of action” (Mardin, 1992, p. 38), has been targeted since the early 
republican era. Despite the fact that there had been some shifts to a more secularized 
state and doctrine in the Ottoman Empire, the paradigmatic break occurred in the 
Republican Turkey. In the Ottoman period, the dominant perception of Islam was 
more reconciliatory, proposing it as a meaningful resource –and as at least something 
to be kept on a cultural level. Moreover, during World War I, Islam was used as an 
advantage in order to stimulate the masses to gather around a common ideal, while 
in the time of foundation years of the republic, it began to be considered a coun-
terrevolutionary threat (Kurtoğlu, 2009, p. 632; Tunçay, 2002, p. 95-96), and thus as 
something that needed to be excluded by educating the society in the supposedly 
correct path with the help of ruling elites and laic education.  
 
According to the republicans, Islam was the main reason why the Ottoman Empire 
had weakened and fallen behind its European counterparts and was thus something 
that ought to be discarded and left behind. In trying to re-construct the state on the 
grounds of a new identity and order, the republican state was well aware that Islam 
always had the potential to become the focus of political power. So, it was subse-
quently declared a sign of deficiency and an obstacle to reaching the level of contem-
porary civilization. By declaring Islam as an impediment to progress (Aktaş, 2009, p. 
742), Kemalism developed three discursive strategies in order to hinder the possibil-
ity of an Islamic revival. The first one was to exclude Islam by marking it as the real 
hostis and transforming it into the Other of the Republic of Turkey. The second at-
tempt targeted the area of everyday practices by restricting the field of Islam in the 
republic to a more individualized and, rationalized structure by way of various appa-
ratuses such as the Diyanet İşleri (Directorate of Religious Affairs). The last strategy 
was to depoliticize Islam by deactivating it as a valid system of thought and removing 
its supporters from the political arena (Çelik, 2002, p. 86-87). Thus, the boundaries of 
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the republic’s main doctrine were determined to limit the extent of Islam and Mus-
lims and to reduce the effects and activities of believers to a minimum, which will be 
discussed in the following sections.  
 
4.1.1. Secularism as Lifesaver 
Although in the late-Ottoman period the Young Ottomans had in mind the idea of 
laicism, they could not put into practice this idea under the rule of the Ottoman Em-
pire. In the republican era, secularism was perceived as freeing the mind from big-
otry, and thus as the safeguard of “freedom” (Berkes, 1998, p. 482). It became the 
touchstone of the modernization process (Keyman, 2003, p. 123) and the main appa-
ratus of the Kemalist elites, from which they drew strength both politically and cul-
turally (Göle, 2011, p. 64).  
 
The modern developments would not have been possible without the light of West-
ern secularization (Berkes, 1998, p. 507). Turkish laicism, as imitating the French 
laïcité, was idealized as the only way to reach the “civilizational” level of contempo-
rary countries and to break the organic bonds transmitted with the cultural accumu-
lation of Islam in the Ottoman Empire (Mardin, 2015, p. 161). In the republican era, 
laicism was ascribed to play the role of “purifying.” It rendered it possible to leave 
the past behind, reach the level of knowledge required in order to establish the sup-
posedly correct life style (Mahçupyan, 1999, p. 106-108).  
 
Laicism assumed to be universal, rational, and scientific, served as the general frame-
work of the principles of Kemalist ideology. Accordingly, rationality and reason were 
absolutized by the Kemalist elites, and ideological debate or differentiation was ulti-
mately out of the question (Mahçupyan, 1999, p. 103). Laicism also rationalized ho-
mogenizing the society and imposing a modern life style on the public. While secu-
larism has been key to the obliteration of the Islamic residues and ingrained struc-
tures, they ignored that Islam has always been a dominant symbolic power and a 
point of cultural reference (Keyman, 2003, p. 125) that was hard to annihilate 
radically and would return as the “return of the oppressed.”  
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4.1.2. Laic Reforms 
The Kemalist fundamental principles are republicanism, populism, laicism, reform-
ism, nationalism, and statism. All of these doctrines, in the early republican era, could 
be assessed as precautions taken in order to entrench the current situation all around 
the state, which aimed build a secular and modernized state. Of these laicism was 
one of the most cataclysmic ones with regard to its extent and results. In order to 
prevent the effects of Islam in the foundation years, many shifts were launched with 
regard to the principle of laicism. First, the principle of laicism was added to the 
agenda of the parliament in 1924. This was followed by a group of major steps, such 
as the abolition of the caliphate and the closure of religious schools, in which the 
main intention was to impose limits on Islam in everyday life practices and to place it 
under the control of the state.  
 
Thereafter, the role of caliph became a symbolic one, the Shaykh al-Islam was not 
allowed to be in the cabinet anymore (1924) and the Diyanet İşleri (Directorate of 
Religious Affairs) was opened in order to individualize and privatize religion (Gülalp, 
2009, p. 678). While this was ostensible purpose of the Diyanet İşleri, it was mainly 
used as another mechanism for controlling religion and religious affairs. The Shari’a 
courts were annulled (1924) in a significant attempt to establish a more secular ad-
ministrative system that would be followed by an essential reforms. The administra-
tive reforms were the symbolic developments in order to affect the daily and sub-
stantial routines of the public. A series of vital precautions were taken such as shut-
ting down the shrines and dervish convents (tekke) which used to function as the 
artery of religious life (1925), and these were followed by the ban on the turban and 
fez (1925).  
 
Besides these, the most far-reaching diffusion was the enactment of Takrir-i Sükun 
Kanunu (the Law on the Maintenance of Order-1925), which resulted in the arrest of 
7,500 people and the execution of 660. Thenceforth, the state turned into an author-
itarian, one-party-state, a dictatorship, and “a power monopoly” (Zürcher, 2004, p. 
173, 176). These reforms were the ultimate intimidations for those who still had not 
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broken their bonds with Islam, and they turned Islam to something that could not be 
publicly displayed.  
 
All these reforms aimed to build a more civilized, that is, Western state. Implemen-
tations such as the acceptance of the Swiss Civil Code (1926), removing reference to 
Islam as the state religion in the constitution (1928), switching to the Latin alphabet 
(1928), and the call to prayer to Turkish (1932) (Mardin, 1991, p. 97) were some of 
them. Furthermore, the Arabic alphabet was no longer taught in schools (Berkes, 
1998, p. 477). All these steps were taken in an attempt to eliminate certain and basic 
Islamic habits and customs in society.  
 
In addition to legal enforcements, there were various attempts to create a cultural 
narrative based upon Turkishness within Kemalist nationalist discourses. The Türk Ta-
rih Kurumu (Turkish Historical Society) (1931) and Türk Dil Kurumu (Turkish Language 
Society) (1932) in particular took fundamental steps with their works to explore the 
roots of Turkish people in the era and the people of Central Asia. They attempted to 
convince people scientifically, to break the connections with their former Ottoman-
Islamic heritage, and to build a new identity that would be detached from the past 
(Söğütlü, 2011, p. 181-182).  
 
All these laic reforms served to sever the ties with the old Ottoman Empire and to 
constitute a modern state. They were implemented in almost every sphere of social 
and political life, from administrative work to daily life practices, and altogether 
blocked the public sphere by allowing the entrance of only those who support the 
reforms. Through these reforms, Islam was politicized, while Muslims in public were 
transformed into Others and treated as an opposition element. The state cut off re-
lations with the Muslim masses in order to accomplish its goal of reaching the level 
of civilized societies.  
 
4.1.3. Repressive Reforms 
Though some might think of the laic reforms as path-breaking attempts, there were 
other reforms that were saliently repressive at the time of the single party. There 
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wastyranny of censorship, cultural alienation, and racism (Karpat, 2014, p. 272) which 
were used to direct, control, and restrict everyone’s movements and activities and to 
propagandize the views of the state.  
 
Atatürk, subsequently muzzling the opposition and the press, felt the tension in the 
society and allowed a new party to be founded called the Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası 
(Free Republican Party-1930), which seemed to be the end of a single party period. 
However, after a while, it came to be viewed as a threat to the state and was dis-
missed. After the closure of the Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası, there occurred an unex-
pected reaction by the people, so the state took the cultural and intellectual life un-
der its control by banning all social and cultural organizations. In time, this attitude 
got so strict that free discussions were only held in closed meetings. Türk Ocakları 
(Turkish Hearths) were shut down in 1931 and replaced with Halkevleri/Halkodaları 
(People’s Houses), which were kept under strict observation. Türk Kadınlar Birliği 
(Turkish Women’s Union), Türk Mason Locaları (Masonic lodges), and liberal and so-
cialist press organs were also closed down in the same period (Zürcher, 2004, p. 174, 
177-180). 
 
These repressive measures were felt in the academy, as well. Darülfünûn (House of 
Multiple Sciences) was transformed into the University of Istanbul, and only strict 
Kemalist supporters were kept in the academy (1933). Both the press and educational 
institutions were guided to disseminate the Kemalist ideology, which engendered an 
“enlightened” group of people, the Kemalist elites, who considered themselves as 
having a mission to enlighten the ignorant subjects (Zürcher, 2004, p. 181), which I 
will discuss later. These reforms and restrictions were to construct a uniform order 
all around the state and prevent any possibility of generating a public outside of the 
state.  
 
4.1.4. In the Light of Positivism 
Kemalists claimed that their ideology was constructed upon the grounds of reason 
and called on the public to “question” and abandon their faith. The reforms, accord-
ingly, were shaped by the principles of reason, science, and secularism by referencing 
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the West and Enlightenment (Cangızbay, 2008, p. 147). They absolutized and reified 
reason, and did not let it be questioned in any way.  
 
This rationalist perception also paved the way for Kemalist intellectuals to break the 
connection with the past and helped them to portray themselves as progressivists, in 
the scheme of segregation between progressivist and reactionaries, namely, the en-
lightened intellectuals and so-called bigots (Mahçupyan, 1999, p. 101-106). Support-
ing the ideology of Kemalism under the light of positivism equaled being regarded as 
a progressivist, whereas those who refuse to follow the same path were seen as re-
actionaries.  
 
4.2. The Kemalist Elites 
As the state annulled the privileged position of Islam and Muslims, it attempted to 
build a society of its own that shared the exact same ideology with the state 
(Mahçupyan, 1998, p. 45-46; Mahçupyan, 1999, p. 97-99). It widened its strata to 
bureaucrats, teachers, doctors, and entrepreneurs who were marked as the elites of 
the society, whereas the craftsmen and small traders were marked as the representa-
tive of tradition and bigotry (Zürcher, 2004, p. 193-194).  
 
Modernism, as an ideology on its own, affected the Ottoman elites of the 19th cen-
tury and turned out to be the distinguishing character of them. They became the 
dominant class in Turkish politics by getting strength from democracy and secularism 
(Karpat, 2014, p. 154-155). Later, the state did not seek any agency in its community 
and prioritized its elites (Mahçupyan, 1998, p. 45-46). These elites could directly be 
associated with the Tanzimat intellectuals of the Ottoman Empire with their laic 
tendencies and status as the chief stimulator in the modernism process.  
 
4.2.1. The Enlightenment and Hegemony 
The ultimate reference points of the elites were reason and science. Also, it was as-
sumed that the elites were the only group who could attain knowledge based upon 
reason. They basically believed that social issues could be solved easily, once they 
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changed the minds of the society (Mardin, 1991, p. 302). Therefore, the role of chang-
ing minds through educating, enlightening, and guiding the masses exactly like a gov-
erness fell to these elites (Cangızbay, 2008, p. 147). Until the masses were sufficiently 
enlightened, the elites were to take political decisions (Söğütlü, 2011, p. 176), which 
they viewed as the easiest method of homogenizing the society (Çaha, 1998, p. 86). 
Their methods could be summarized as follows:  
This revolution dubbed the Kemalist revolution was a radical project of mod-
ernization. It imposed upon the society modernization and westernization in 
a Jacobinistic way. Yet there is a particularity which renders the Kemalist rev-
olution different from those in Europe. . . . But Kemalism was not a movement 
which was propelled by the people's support and had a social correspond-
ence. It was, as it were, a putschist movement led by an enlightened class of 
military officers and bureaucrats organized around the nascent nation-state. 
This enlightened class that saw itself as elitist put into practice a project –in 
the name of modernizing and civilizing a society it considered to be ignorant, 
boorish and hidebound– which had no respect for any of the values of that 
society. That is to say that in the revolutions in Europe it was the people who 
decided that tradition was not sustainable anymore. However, in Turkey, it 
was not the people, but this cadre of elitists who ruled that tradition was not 
sustainable anymore. (Aktaşlı, 2011, p. 149-150) 
However, what left unnoticed was the fact that the state, indeed, generated a hier-
archical, hegemonic relation in the society by way of these enlightened elites. Declar-
ing the elites as the “superior,” as those who should guide the masses, meaning that 
they saw society as an infant to be educated. By their enlightened minds, they de-
clared a strict culture war against their own public.  
 
Especially after the 1930s, all cultural events started to be arranged in the Public 
Houses, and the state prohibited cultural and intellectual events that had not been 
approved by the state. Closing NGOs, the strict censorship policy, and control over 
the press were examples of their project (Söğütlü, 2011, p. 176). This was the only 
possibility they could have for addressing and reaching the masses, and it served their 
own class and ideology. Moreover, their project excluded the Others of the state, 
particularly Muslim citizens for my main focus, signifying that modernization process 
was not for the folk, but for the elites.   
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4.3. The Public Sphere in the Republican Era 
In the second chapter, I depicted the conditions of possibility of the public sphere in 
the Ottoman Empire. Compared to the restricted and stratified atmosphere in the 
Ottoman Empire, samples of public sphere could be observed in the Habermasian 
sense of the term. Even though there were inspectors in the public sphere, the com-
munication, transmission of knowledge, the dissemination of the news around every 
topic, were applied as far as possible and public sphere gathered different types of 
people. In this part of my thesis, I will question the public sphere by highlighting the 
ways in which it was invaded by Kemalist ideology. 
 
4.3.1. The Coffee Shops 
Compared to their vibrancy during the imperial rule, coffee shops appeared to lose 
their former identity and vitality in the early republican era (Georgeon, 1999, p. 80). 
While in the past coffee shops were places where discussions on various topics took 
place, their function was intermittently restricted by political interventions in the re-
publican period. Discussing issues of politics in coffee shops, not least communist 
propaganda and reactionary movements (Öztürk, 2006, p. 359-360, 364), was banned 
(as cited in Öztürk, 2006, p. 104).  
 
Moreover, the coffee shops of minorities were closed because of the rise of Turkish 
nationalist movements (Öztürk, 2006, p. 99). The previous texture of the public 
sphere unraveled by being transformed into a justification mechanism of Kemalist 
propaganda (Ercins, 2013, p. 298). Only with the foundation of the short-lived Serbest 
Cumhuriyet Fırkası (Free Republican Party), were coffee shops able to become places 
of debate again. But still, they did not amount to a Habermasian public sphere, let 
alone generating intellectual creativity and opposition to the state through dis-
courses. Deprived of its intellectual productivity and condemned to being a medium 
of ideological propaganda, the public sphere regressed in the early republican era.  
 
Despite this, some coffee shops from the late Ottoman period and continued to exist 
in the early republican era, and others established in the early republican era lasted 
until the 1960s. Küllük, İhsan Kıraathanesi, İkbal Kıraathanesi, Meserret Kıraathanesi 
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and Marmara Kıraathanesi might be cited as examples in this respect. These coffee 
houses were places where intellectuals, professors, students and reporters used to 
gather (Sökmen, 2011).  
 
Though there were some coffee shops that maintained the characteristics of a public 
sphere, the impacts of Kemalist ideology on coffee shops reemerged in the following 
process: In 1940, specific groups started to be centered in certain coffee shops as a 
result of the debate of new-old literature. Leftists were gathering in Küllük 
Kıraathanesi while Çınaraltı Kahvesi was the gathering place of rightists. (Anar, 2012, 
p. 236-250). They read different periodicals, such as Büyük Doğu34 and Akbaba rep-
resenting rightists, and Forum representing leftists. As a consequence, coffee shops 
turned into a nerve center for political groups, lost their function of serving publicity, 
and triggered political polarization. In contrast to the way coffee shops and newspa-
pers served to generate public opinion in the late Ottoman period, following the early 
republican era, coffee shops, newspapers and periodicals undertook the task of frac-
tionalizing and ideologizing. Each of them mobilized and fed their community ideo-
logically.  
 
4.3.2. Other Types of Gatherings 
Even though the vitality of coffee shops seemed to be lost in the early republican era 
due to the severe censorship policies, some private gatherings continued to be held. 
In these gatherings, the scale of the variety of guests was restricted when compared 
to the gatherings of the Ottoman Empire. At one such gathering held in the house of 
Sabahattin Eyüboğlu, almost all the guests were bohemians, artists, and higher-rank-
ing officials such as Hasan Âli Yücel, Melih Cevdet Anday, Adalet Cimcoz, and Nurullah 
Ataç, who talked about art and literature. In the house of Ekrem Hakkı Ayverdi, there 
also occurred gatherings of a religious nature, and they used to talk about music, art, 
literature, and politics (Anar, 2012, p. 182, 191-195).  
                                                                                                                                                                    
34 Though Büyük Doğu is mainly referred to as being the representative of Islamist ideology, 
it should be noted that it actually gathered diversity of writers from different ideological 
poles, in the beginning periods of its establishment. In his book Bâbıâli, Necip Fazıl notes that 
some of the writers in Büyük Doğu, like Bedri Rahmi and Fikret Adil, were disturbed by the 
Islamist propaganda in the magazine, and chose to move away (Kısakürek, 1975, p. 287). 
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In time, due to economic and social shifts, the effects of mansions and houses de-
creased (Ülger, 2008, p. 204). The places of gatherings diversified and came to include 
hotels, pubs, and confectioneries. In Elif Oteli, which dominantly functioned as a lit-
erature group, it was the essential principle not to talk about religion and politics in 
order to prevent a chaotic atmosphere. There were also confectioneries such as Le-
bon, Markiz, Baylan, Nisuaz, and Petrograd (Anar, 2012, p. 277, 285-328). Even 
though the numbers of intellectuals were high in these gatherings, their strata were 
not varied. Especially after the 1950s, these literary gatherings changed their location 
due to newly emerging social activities in places ranging from Divanyolu to Beyoğlu 
(Anar, 2012, p. 77), since the Tanzimat period.  
 
4.3.3. The Ideological Public Sphere 
The public, in the foundation years of the republican era, was designed as an appa-
ratus for shaping the masses in accordance with the Kemalist ideology. The public 
was not a product of the bourgeoisie as in the European case, and not coordinated 
with the intellectuals as in the Ottoman case, but functioned more as a device of 
authoritarian state modernism. The public (sphere) was mostly a place for the appli-
cation of modernist practices (Göle, 2013, p. 22, 24) and for intervention into the 
daily life of citizens. In this regard, it is fair to say that the public sphere failed in hav-
ing a free, rational, and critical debate atmosphere, moreover, it became an era of 
permeating into the fields of individuals.  
 
There were many instances where the state imposed its ideology on the public as 
part of the modernization process. In the Turkish case, by choosing the path of West 
and idealizing it, the state transformed into an ideology producer and edifier in the 
public sphere (Söğütlü, 2011, p. 182). This kind of public sphere could be defined as 
an “ideological public sphere” in which there was a homogenous ideological system, 
not welcoming of diversity and discussion. 
 
In addition to this, in this Kemalist ideological public sphere, with regard to its nature 
of being shaped by the enlightened elites and their secular rules, and their govern-
ance through a strict homogeneity (Suman, 2000, p. 72), the state only cared for a 
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specific group while excluding the others and their ideas (Çaha, 2004, p. 92-93). The 
ideological public sphere in Turkey, inevitably, generated polarization, which was a 
result of reducing the plural characteristics of Ottoman society into the homogenous 
character of Turkey (Mardin, 1994, p. 263).  
 
The exclusions and inclusions fed the elites both ideally and institutionally (Gülalp, 
2009, p. 685), and led to a hegemonic relation between secular progressivists and 
Muslim reactionaries. Inside the portrayal of hegemony, a Muslim’s exclusion from 
the public sphere could easily be based on a secular’s consideration of inadequacy in 
modern representation. Some cults, sects, organizations, and media organs were also 
not suitable for a modern representation (Çaha, 2004, p. 77-78) because they signi-
fied the traditional and Islamic.  
 
While submissive people who cared for the rules of the recently formed ideology 
were considered progressivist, the rest who still had belief and in the old, traditional, 
Islamic values were perceived as reactionaries. Muslims were excluded from the 
Turkish public sphere and were left with the feeling of cultural alienation (Mert, 1997, 
p. 114). In the Turkish case, the public sphere was used as a constitutive element and 
a control mechanism to segregate the society with a distinct division between those 
who could be modern and civilized, by being loyal to Kemalist ideology, and those 
who could not accomplish this and stayed behind.  
 
To sum up, I suggest that as a result of the strict reforms and policies of the Kemalist 
hegemony, the structure of the public sphere transformed from an intellectual one 
into a political one that was dominated by an ideological agenda. Thanks to the influ-
ences of Kemalist ideology, it was not possible to preserve the former structure of 
the public sphere, and it was damaged intellectually throughout the process. In the 
aftermath of a series of implementations, especially the attempt to restrict everyday 
life spaces of Muslim citizens and to subject them to segregation, the public sphere 
started to be dominated by a Kemalist class, as if the intellectual opportunities be-
longed to this group of “enlightened” elites.  
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Though the public sphere was interrupted by a Kemalist intervention, there were 
some ambivalences that made it possible to provide ground for gatherings on a lim-
ited scale. After strict censorship policies had begun loosening, coffee shops were 
again able to gather intellectuals. However, there were still various tacit rules that 
had to be followed when it came to discussions relating to politics and religion. Also, 
the gathering places varied thanks to economic and social shifts, and intellectual 
gatherings started to be held in various places such as hotels and confectionaries in 
addition to coffee shops. The literature debates in 1940 paved the way for the sub-
jection of coffee shops to a polarization between the rightists and the leftists. The 
ideological public sphere was influential on the cultural atmosphere. It seems that 
the transformation of the public sphere in Turkey proceeded from political to 
intellectual, in strict contrast to the theory of Habermas.  
 
4.3.4. The Public in the Face of Kemalism 
The ideological public sphere stood still until the 1950s. Especially with the DP win-
ning the 1950 election, Kemalism was shattered, which put secularism in question 
(Mert, 1997, p. 109). The periphery was about to revive: the Anatolians immigrated 
to the larger cities and the increasing level of knowledge and awareness of the public 
around political issues sharpened the ideological polarization between Islam and Ke-
malism. They were not dependent on the Kemalists and their homogenizing doctrine 
anymore (Mardin, 1994, p. 255-256).  
 
In order to settle the conflicts arising from this increasing social polarization, coups 
d’etat were carried out in 1960, 1971, and 1980. However, these attempts did not 
suffice to pacify the society, and instead augmented the level of polarization. The 
polarization, which was sown by the Kemalist reforms and triggered in the 1940s via 
the coffee shops, intensified especially after the 1960 coup d’etat. The political polar-
ization reproduced rightist and leftist camps in universities. The latest news was dis-
cussed in classes and friendships were formed on an ideological level (Kök, 2009, p. 
93).  A historically prevalent example for this could be the use of parka and beard, by 
members of particular groups as symbols of their support for a single political or ide-
ological view. In this way, members of a group could be distinguished easily in the 
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society by their choice of symbols. As a result, large numbers of academics were fired 
from schools.  
 
Since then, polarization has transformed into a more positional one, that is, rather 
than imposing sanctions based upon visible violence, it happened to change its form 
into a more veiled one, as was vividly observed in the coup of February 28, 1997. The 
sociopolitical effects of this polarization can still be felt in Turkey. I will discuss the 
impacts of polarization on the academic outlook in Turkey, focusing mainly the early 
2000s.  
 
4.3.5. Muslims in the Public Sphere 
As I tried to explain above, there have been strict shifts both within the policies of 
the state and in the course of everyday life with regard to religious issues. These shifts 
have been inherited from the early republican era, and clashes continuously took 
place between the reactionaries and the progressivists. In this part, I will try to un-
derline the position of Muslims in the public sphere and the polarization that has 
been maintained since the early republican era. Although polarization seemed to be 
abated at times, I argue that it nonetheless permeated the existence of the Republic 
of Turkey. 
 
To reiterate, this polarization process in Turkey remained as a heritage of Turkey. 
Kemalism expanded every area of its ideological public sphere to the degree that 
there was not a single space left for Muslims to enter, or even dare to enter. There-
fore, Muslims had to build their own counter-public spheres in their homes and edu-
cate themselves, and, as time unfolded, they expanded their area into the republican 
public sphere (Yavuz, 2005, p. 168) as an inevitable consequence of the oppressive 
policies and attitudes of secularists.  
 
The first entrance of Muslims into the public sphere, through gainingboth intellectual 
capital and political strength, coincided with the political Islamist movement in the 
1980s. The empowerment of Muslim intellectuals started showing up in the public 
sphere, which was also directly connected with the rise in Islamist periodicals and 
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newspapers. They moved the periphery into the center, both culturally and politi-
cally. They started overcoming the republican prejudices and Muslim stereotypes as 
“passive, ignorant and reactionary” (Göle, 2011, p. 82-83). Muslims were now visible 
in public pushing the limits and claiming a share in the same everyday life of secular-
ists (Göle, 2012, p. 89-90) within their Muslim identities. As Islamic factors moved 
into the public, their entrance was perceived as a violation of what had been a secu-
larist environment where laic discourse was dominant. Relating to the political rise of 
Muslims, they were also normalized and active in the socio-cultural fields (Göle, 2013, 
p. 11, 20).  
 
The university, media, and politics, which used to belong to the laics, transformed 
into a more debatable platform with the entrance of Islamists into these areas. Sec-
ularists felt dissatisfied sharing their publics with them (Göle, 2013, p. 33), always 
forgetting that the public should embrace everyone and be open to all. They always 
felt intimidated by Muslims, assuming that they would disturb the legitimacy of their 
entrenched modernization equation. They believed that Muslims would question 
their attitude that marks the modern as equal to the West, and would end up dissolv-
ing the pre-accepted agreement of equality between modernity and Westernization.  
 
Overall, the efforts to ban Islam from the public sphere triggered politicized Islam 
(Çelik, 2002, p. 91) while regarding laicism as an opposition of religion by the govern-
ment (Kurtoğlu, 2009, p. 633). Moreover, the rise of Refah Partisi (Welfare Party) and 
politicized Islam intimidated the secular elitists, and in order to clean the public 
sphere from Islamists, they made a coup d’etat on 28 February 1997. In addition, the 
rising press and media organs favored that the public sphere should belong to a spe-
cific stratum without including the Other (Bacık, 2005, p. 13). The headscarf ban was 
an example of the perspective of a homogenized public sphere in which the Others 
had to be excluded. They generated their ideological public sphere, and the official 
hostis in the Republic of Turkey became Muslims once again.  
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4.4. The Academy Until the Early 2000s 
In the first part of this chapter, I depicted the ideological and hegemonic position that 
Kemalism held in Turkey. In all dictates, the governing parties are prone to shape and 
direct the academy with regard to their ideologies. Therefore, the academy since the 
1930s tacitly shares the same enforced ideology, asks for re-producing it repeatedly 
and those who do not re-produce it are excluded. Accordingly, since the early repub-
lican era, the unswerving elements of the academy have been the Kemalist-ideology, 
Western-based doctrine, and the exclusion of Muslims from both the public sphere 
and academy.  
 
In this atmosphere permeated by politics, culture and academy were formed by pol-
itics as well. In the history of the Turkish academy, there have been numerous exam-
ples of ideological oppression on both official and personal levels. The rejection of 
Mehmet Akif Ersoy’s book as a school book and the rejection of Nurettin Topçu, who 
was a PhD student at the Sorbonne University, from Istanbul University in the late 
1940s (Kara, 2016, p. 40) can be considered to be a socio-cultural instantiation of the 
dominant ideology (Kök, 2009, p. 101). These were the indications of non-declared 
but well-practiced ideological segregation.  
 
Through the coup d’etat of February 28, the official discourse was plainly manifested 
on every level of the state and in the academy as well. The fact that Alev Erkilet was 
fired from the academy because of her religious identity belongs to the same phe-
nomena. Despite the fact that the headscarf ban was annulled in the 2000s, it did not 
follow that stories of personal oppression and the academic apartheid abruptly came 
to an end. In this part, from the standpoint that the public sphere need be established 
between the equals, I will point out the academic apartheid and hegemony that 
lasted until the early 2000s and give examples of the unilaterally reduced public 
sphere.  
 
One example could be found in the memoirs of Kemal Karpat: In the 1960’s, Karpat, 
who could be defined as a more conservative academic, wrote an appreciation letter 
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to Niyazi Berkes who was well known for his strict commitment to Atatürk and lai-
cism. Karpat declared that he would go from Boston to Montreal in order to meet 
with Berkes. However, the latter seemed rather unimpressed, stating that he was not 
going to be in Montreal at those times. Soon after this exchange, Berkes published a 
critique of one of Karpat’s books. According to Karpat, the underlying reason for this 
critique was the ideological opposition of Berkes to himself. After a while, they ran 
into each other to attend a conference. Only the seat next to Karpat was available, 
and Berkes was obliged to sit next to him. Berkes said: “I am talking to you as some-
one who criticized your book.” In another meeting, following the first one, Berkes did 
not greet Karpat (Karpat, 2015, p. 320-325).  
 
After being excluded from his position in university in 1948 (Kayalı, 1989, p. 52), Ni-
yazi Berkes started living and lecturing in Canada. On this basis, one would expect 
that Berkes should end up being conscious, sensible, and distant towards the ideo-
logical limitations in Turkey. Yet, his way of living, based upon his ideological commit-
ment, detained him from building healthy personal relations with other academics. 
Contrary to what he criticized, he could not succeed to give appropriate and unbiased 
responses, as he would expect from an “enlightened,” “modern” academic.  
 
My main argument is that the situation in the academy immediately pertained to the 
Kemalist effect, the ideological public sphere, and polarization. The fundamental 
characteristic of the academy, which I will elaborate in this part, has been its West-
ernization effort and the Kemalist impact since the foundation of modern Turkey. 
Afterwards, I would like to reveal the loss of power of the academy which will be 
followed by visualizing the Muslims in the academy and end up with polarization be-
tween the Muslims and secularists.  
 
4.4.1. Being Westernized 
Since the dawn of the Renaissance, the West has been considered as the reference 
of modernity (Göle, 2011, p. 66), and the modernization process was based on its 
ideals and principles since the Tanzimat era. From that time, civilization has been 
assumed to be equal to the West, and this view reached its peak in the republican 
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era. The West was perceived as the ideal model, and Westernization was presumed 
to be the way that would bring the society together with the level of contemporary 
countries. Therefore, Westernization was taken as the primal constituent of the mod-
ernization process within a wide range of fields covering politics, plastic arts, and 
modern novel. In the foundation era of the republic, as an indication of moderniza-
tion, conservatoires were opened where musicians, theater actors, and ballet per-
formers were educated. The idealization of the Westernization process could be 
found in the academy and bureaucracy as well (Mardin, 1991, p. 215-216). 
 
As an inevitable result of this process, intellectuals started grounding their scientific 
principles on the West (Göle, 2011, p. 32) –to the degree that, in order to be an intel-
lectual, one had to transmit the Western doctrine as a means of the modernization 
process. Their sole justification mechanism was being modernist, and they defined 
themselves with regard to their high culture and Westernness, and thus modernness 
(Göle, 2010, p. 96). In other words, the only way to be admitted to the academy has 
been to have a “contemporary brain” (Türköne, 1998, p. 103).  
 
The basic premise has been that they not only benefited from Westernization, but 
also absolutized the West. Due to the fear of returning to the oppressed past, they 
have not been interested in the Islamic cultural heritage, which also had a variety of 
sources. The initial problem was the fact that the West was not only a system of prin-
ciples to be predicated on; it has also magnified every step of the way. Having been 
haunted by the fear of returning to the past, Kemalist ideology ignored the Islamic 
cultural heritage. It marked Islam as a value belonging to the Ottoman heritage, which 
equally had the accumulation to serve the academy with avariety of sources. Thus, 
Islamic heritage has been insistently considered a threat to each and every individual, 
and to society at large.  
The impact of the society of Islam on the enlightened is terrible. A modern 
Muslim can be raised in the Europe or USA. But there is no modern Muslim in 
Islamic countries, but Turkey. For there is no question. There is no chance (for 
a modern Muslim to be raised) when there is no questioning of anything. 
(Yıldırım, 2007, p. 256)  
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Moreover, the unconditional admiration of the West caused the education system to 
generate individuals who were encouraged to think within the limits of a determined 
frame, that is, who were stereotyped and homogenized.  
 
4.4.2. Kemalism as the Norm 
While Kemalism was not predominant in politics especially after the 1950s, it kept its 
nature of being the central signifier after the 1950s. This was because the idea of a 
“Westernized, national, secular state” and the general norms of Kemalism remained 
and even continued to determine the basis of politics. With regard to this, Kemalism 
became an entity that “signifies everything and nothing,” “is present in everywhere 
and nowhere,” and inevitably affected every party. Even though it transformed into 
a more symbolic system of ideals after the 1990s (Yeğen, 2002, p. 63-64, 66, 70), it 
has still been an empty signifier (Çelik, 2002, p. 90).   
 
As indicated in the first chapter, normalization was one of the core features that 
paved the way for the collapse of the public. In the case of Turkey, the norm has been 
the Kemalist ideology since the foundation of the Republic. As stressed by Arendt 
“society always demands that its members act as though they were members of one 
enormous family which has only one opinion and one interest” (Arendt, 1998, p. 39). 
The Kemalist effect in the academy has regarded itself as constituting the norm and 
has enforced its set of behaviors. Therefore, other groups, such as Muslims and other 
minorities, have been absorbed by the so-called objective doctrine of Kemalists. Ac-
ademics who did not subscribed to the Kemalist ideology were not even regarded as 
genuine intellectuals.  
 
4.4.2.1. The Kemalist Effect in the Academy 
In order to spread the Kemalist ideology and avoid other ideologies, keeping only the 
Kemalist supporters in the universities has been a deep-seated essential in Turkey 
since 1933. Kemalism has had significant effects on the academy; the dominant aca-
demics have always been Kemalists, and the academy has been laden with the Kema-
list doctrine (Toprak, 1998, p. 240). The leftist intellectuals, also, in Turkey, have taken 
the principles of Kemalism, such as laicism, positivism, and Westernized revolutions 
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and located themselves as opposite to or distanced from religion (Aktaş, 2009, p. 725-
726, 734-735). Therefore, we can say that the academy has been replete with both 
Kemalist and leftist intellectuals as prototypes of Kemalism. That is to say, Kemalism 
and the Left movement have the same stereotyped mind on the process of modern-
ization (Tunçay, 1991, p. 14; Köker, 1991, p. 25-42) since they were both educated in 
the same politically and ideologically dominated education system (Parla, 1991, p. 
50).  
 
That is to say, ever since the foundation of the republic, Kemalists to leftists have 
admired modernization as a sacred precept and considered the academy and public 
sphere as the line of defense from other ideologies.  
 
4.4.3. The Biased Perception of the Academy 
In describing the effect of Kemalist elites in the founding years of Turkey above, I also 
pointed out that the social system and the decision-making process was also held by 
the Kemalist elites. Even though reproducing the official ideology used to belong to 
the state elites, the academy always had the mission of reproducing this ideology 
with different nuances and of disseminating and protecting it. This mission encour-
aged academics to produce politics rather than science (Mahçupyan, 1999, p. 101).  
 
Since the early republican era, intellectuals have been entrusted as the bearers of 
politics in the universities and in their academic works. As a result, intellectuals in 
Turkey used their knowledge as an apparatus of propaganda and position themselves 
against what was viewed as sacred in society. While they attempted to exclude sacred 
values from the public consciousness, they did not realize that they have generated 
a new religion of their own: their biased perception of knowledgehas almost be-
comea religion on its own, without being able to generate a proper system of 
knowledge (Arslan, 1999, p.73-74).                
Faculty of Political Sciences received a large number of students from Imam-
Hatip High Schools. Most of these students are quite hardworking. Of course, 
it is not right to say for all of those students that they will stay under the ab-
solute influence of the religious teachings. However, I have to say that their 
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vision of thought is tightly narrow due to the limitations created by their belief 
system. (Kabaş, 2010, p. 187)  
As Weber states, sociology cannot do politics to propagandize its own ideas. Politics 
and science cannot meet or merge; otherwise, they both lose their meanings. There-
fore, politics has to be kept outside of academic studies (as cited in Yergin, 1999, p. 
44). However, keeping politics inside the academy has been a holdover from the bu-
reaucrat intellectuals, the founders of the academy who made it a “politic orthodoxy” 
and a place of “official ideology” (Arslan, 1999, p. 75). Intellectuality of a person was 
decided through their political and religious affairs. Only with the acceptance of the 
enlightened academics did the privilege of entrance to the dominant class of the 
academy become possible (Vergin, 2006, p. 33) –a sign that the academy turned itself 
into an ideology (Mahçupyan, 2004, p. 34).  
 
In this approach, they were categorizing the people and locating them into a foreor-
dained place. In a passage quoted from Türkan Saylan, we can observe how the Ke-
malist ideology has been idealized: “A large part of universities was established on 
political grounds and with the pressure of the reactionaries; since these places were 
fortresses of the religionists and bigots, now is it that a battle is being fought to whip 
these into shape” (Saçlıoğlu, 2009, p. 165). That is to say, the main drive of the acad-
emy has become affecting politics, while those who were inactive on this basis were 
discredited and the academy have used knowledge as a justification mechanism 
while idealizing itself (Mahçupyan, 2004, p. 38, 40).  
 
Another point is that knowledge has not been considered a public property (Mardin, 
2015, p. 223) with a shared value. This could also be rooted back to the Westerniza-
tion efforts and the denial of Islam: In the early republican era, the foundational dis-
course treated the East as a reactionary symbol, and it was not considered as a wide 
source of wisdom. The modernist perspective have sometimes insulted, sometimes 
ignored the East (Erkilet, 2009, p. 1066). Furthermore, intellectuals have rejected the 
position of religion as the starting point of the society (Mardin, 1991, p. 214). The 
tension between the Muslims and Kemalist secularists have remained the same due 
to the constant belief of the latter that Islam and modernism, and religion and science 
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cannot exist together (Karpat, 2014, p. 280). The secular intellectuals only have pri-
oritized their own views and knowledge, while they have rejected the views and cul-
tural sources of Islam. All of this led to a communitarian system, that is, a Gemein-
schaft in which only like-minded people have been praised and supported.  
 
The nature of the mainstream academy have prevented renewing itself and being 
open to change, only reproducing itself and its discourses. In order to produce quali-
fied objects, an autonomous area far from the authority has been required. The vi-
cious circle of the academy have reproduced the same problems repeatedly rather 
than solving the problems of the society. Scientific activities have been dependent on 
a hegemonic politics. The academics have constructed their ivory towers and ghetto-
ized the academy (Vergin, 1999, p. 38).   
 
The academy in Turkey has been an era of biased knowledge and illiberality, which 
have precluded generating objective, qualified knowledge that is independent and 
free from politics. It has lacked an objective standpoint to understand the society 
since it has adhered to the dominant, prejudiced presuppositions and the idea that 
intellectuals have served the absolute, ideal model that should civilize the society.  
 
4.4.4. The Neoliberal Effect in the Academy 
The effects of the cultural clash that Turkey has been experiencing represented itself 
in the academy in various ways, as well. One of the most significant manifestations 
of this, and the very reason for it, has been that the society lost a fundamental ele-
ment: the traditional reciprocal relation of speech and mutual sharing among people. 
This could also be associated with the rise of neoliberalism in the society. As indicated 
in the first chapter neoliberalism underlies the current circumstance, and the neolib-
eral effect can be felt in the academy as well. Neoliberal subjects present themselves 
as products and only by way of working can they realize themselves (Dardot & Laval, 
2014).  
 
Neoliberalism at the academic level prevented communication and encouraged self-
marketing. Furthermore, in this neoliberal world, subjects only care about their own 
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interest and are willing to maximize their profit. In other words, the conditions of 
possibilities of a destructive Gemeinschaft, which requires the expelling of enemies 
in order to buttress their fraternity (Sennett, 2002, p. 266), become actualized. In the 
case of Turkey, I think that destructive Gemeinschaft and a ghettoization have been 
at work between the secular and the Muslim academics.  
 
As a result of this process, academics have shown a lack of interest in each other’s 
academic works and lost touch with each other. A dual world has occurred in which 
everyone started to address their own social district. The dominant ideology has been 
exclusionist (Mahçupyan, 2004, p. 55; Vergin, 2006, p. 34-35), inheriting the approach 
of Kemalist ideology. This paradigmatic loss echoed in the academy in the way aca-
demics have become disinterested in those who do not share the same ideas/ideol-
ogy as they do.  
 
4.4.5. The Position of Muslims in the Academy 
Ever since the exclusion of non-Kemalist academics from the university in the 1930s, 
there has been a tacit rule in the republican Turkey that was accepted by default: in 
order to get involved in the public sphere, in other words, to be a modern citizen, one 
had to be consistent with the Western life, discourse, and attitude. A dominant “prag-
matist-elitist-rationalist” methodology has been followed (Nalçaoğlu, 1999, p. 85). 
Only those who live a non-Muslim, laic life could get prestige and symbolic capital, 
which in total restricted the public sphere to a specific social-status group. A civilized 
person became equivalent to a Western person in Turkey, including and transforming 
the Muslim habitus (Göle, 2011, p. 32). “I think we mean someone who is educated, 
modernized, and perhaps follows the secular trajectory of the Republic of Atatürk 
ideologically. . . . It seems to me that we conceive the enlightened almost as a laic 
person. More, this person even need not be an intellectual” (Yıldırım, 2007, p. 333).  
 
This has been pertinent to the processes the Republic of Turkey passed through, and 
secular academics have interiorized this as a rule. The academy has always been a 
preserver of secular doctrine, which led to the attitude of not including Muslims into 
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this area and not classifying them as an intelligentsia (Mert, 1997, p. 109). Each stu-
dent should have a thorough grasp of Western and secular doctrine while ignoring 
the Islamic doctrine.  
 
Despite the fact that Muslims were excluded from the public sphere, by acquiring the 
same privileges as secularists had, Muslims have entered into the public sphere and 
gained legitimacy and prestige since the 1980s. From then onward, they have fol-
lowed the same path in their education and universal language as well as the secu-
larists. They all had modern Turkish characteristics and public visibility and became 
able to speak Western languages, which equated them with secular intellectuals. 
Considering this, the secularists reacted to them politically (Göle, 2011, p. 107-111).  
 
The situation of the academy could be likened to the foundation of the academies 
through the rise of the Renaissance. They have been institutionalized in order to im-
prove art and science. However, in time, it became evident that these academic ac-
tivities were not open to all, but were for a narrow elite stratum. In other words, the 
academy was a place of hierarchy, based on equality, which also consisted some 
“more equals.” The main issue and claim of academy seem to lose its meaning, turn-
ing into “An institution while claiming to create something inhibiting the creativity 
with rigid principles” (Vergin, 1999, p. 37-38).  
 
The products of Islam have to be discussed as a public property (Mardin, 2015, p. 
221). Even though there have been some examples of Muslim intellectuals such as 
İsmet Özel and Necip Fazıl Kısakürek who have benefitted from secular discourse 
(Mardin, 2015, p. 165) and fought with secular intellectuals via their secular discourse 
(Mardin, 1991, p. 230-232), they have not properly been addressed. They have only 
gained credence in their narrow circle and addressed only Muslims.  
 
We can observe that even though Islamists have taken significant steps to manifest 
their presence in the academy, it still cannot be said that they succeeded tofitinto the 
measures of secular intellectuals. This is mainly because Muslim academics usually 
did not fit in the conditions that a modern and Westernized intellectual would be 
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expected to have. From a Kemalist viewpoint, Muslim academics have been regarded 
as constituting the periphery, bereft of an open-minded worldview, as opposed to 
the former’s imagined superiority. Having operated a process of othering towards 
Islamists and claiming that they are rigid and narrow-minded, the Kemalist ideology 
itself represented the actual conservative position.  
 
4.5. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I presented a detailed portrayal of how the 20thcentury Kemalist laic 
reforms and policies directly affected the Turkish academy until the early 2000s by 
generating a visible polarization between secular intellectuals and Muslim intellectu-
als. As a result of this process, the existence of Muslims was restricted; Kemalists 
attempted to establish a hegemony not only in social life but also in the academy as 
well. The most important example of this has been the antagonistic relationship be-
tween the secularists and Muslims. 
 
From the first chapter, I have aimed to articulate the conditions of the possibility of 
the public sphere. It is plausible to agree that it is not possible for human being to 
reach an absolute, mutual truth due to the plurality and diversity of human nature. 
However, societies must compromise on certain common denominators in order 
to live together. As I have argued, the Ottoman Empire, despite all its negative as-
pects, succeeded in generating a more proper public sphere –in the Habermasian 
sense of the term- than the republican era.  
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
 
The core objective of this thesis is to trace the polarization between secular and Mus-
lim academics in Turkish academic circles back to its origins. I have focused on the 
theory of public sphere of Jürgen Habermas with its emphasis on equality among par-
ticipants of a public sphere and on the possibility of bringing different social groups 
together without exception. In the first chapter, I explain the rise and fall of the public 
(sphere). The second chapter presents a depiction of the public (sphere) in the Otto-
man Empire as it was represented by the friendship of Mehmet Akif Ersoy, a Muslim 
intellectual, and Mithat Cemal Kuntay, a secular intellectual, referencing the 
monography of Mehmet Akif written by Mithat Cemal. By this means I have tried to 
understand the conditions which led the two to gather and constitute an instance of 
the public sphere. In the last chapter, I probe the course of public (sphere) through-
out the republican era.  
 
In the first chapter, I suggest that plurality and speech are essential to maintaining 
the human life and to the creation of the public accordingly. Insofar as speech and 
plurality consist the basis of the public, the public could reach its ultimate goal of 
having a place of gathering to share and express ideas through critical discourse and 
debate.  
 
Despite the well-known opposition between the public and the private, these two 
have become interwoven in time. This intertwinement is evidenced by the fact that 
their etymological roots show that the private supervises the public while the public 
regulates and forms the private. As a result, the private played an important role both 
in the making and the collapse of the public.  
 
The public used to denote different meanings, especially in the Middle Ages, where 
the public was considered to be a sign of a status and where there was a “representa-
tive publicness.” With the birth of humanism in the 16th century, the perception of 
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public began to change. Since then, the public has gained a publicity feature by ad-
dressing every single citizen. In the 17th century, the notion started to signify the 
court, the bourgeoisie, and the aristocrats. Only after the 18th century did it start to 
encompass friends, family, and unfamiliar people. At last, the notion of thepublic 
came to signify an achievable rank and status for everyone, based on critical dis-
course and made possible through expressing and exchanging the ideas.  
 
Bourgeois men in Europe, who emerged as a class in the 18th century, as the pioneers 
of the public, started to produce the literary public sphere. Though they started with 
a different concern, that is, aiming at commodity exchange and social labor, in the 
beginning, their debates reached to the extent that covered intellectual issues. Ac-
companied by their effective contribution to the cultural atmosphere both financially 
and intellectually, they paved the way for a diversity of social interaction that pro-
moted free thinking.  
 
In this regard, it should be mentioned that publicity played a significant role in the 
constitution of the public sphere. Starting with the process after the parliament de-
bates held open to the public in the 18th century by the effort of the press on-rise, 
the citizens’ information level increased and the political debates became a public 
matter. Coupled with the arising social awareness, publicity led to enlightenment in 
the society by offering to the subjects a chance to be the active producers of the 
cultural environment instead of being subjects of interpellation.  
 
In the 17th century, new socializing apparatuses emerged, such as cafes, theaters and 
parks. Following these increasing number of possibilities, literary critical centers 
started to emerge in coffee houses, table societies, and salons. The central premise 
in these social gatherings was to prioritize equality among people, regardless of one’s 
class or status, and attribute central importance to the union, in order to provide the 
basis for the flow of ideas. 
 
As far as the literary public sphere is concerned, coffee houses were the major engine 
that boosted the public opinion. In coffee houses, periodicals became the main topic 
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of discussion and encouraged readers in the coffee houses to participate. The cultural 
atmosphere provided by coffee houses and periodicals was followed by newspapers, 
reading circles and book clubs. Especially, the cultural process was augmented by the 
sake of newspapers, which performed as the “bearers and leaders of public opinion-
weapons of party politics” (as cited in Habermas, 1979, p. 200). That is, newspapers 
had been a significant transformative element in that they stirred and directed the 
public opinion and discussion.  
 
After presenting the conditions of possibilities of the public sphere, I have elaborated 
the reasons for the collapse of the public. I suggest that the reasons for the break-
down of the public sphere could roughly be listed as in the following: the enlarging 
of the city, the break in human relations, the rise of the importance of personality 
and psychoanalysis, the development of electronic communication, the growth of in-
dustrial production, the obligation of normalization, the emergence of the social 
realm, neoliberalism and finally the destructive Gemeinschaft.  
 
In addition to former analyses, I find it important to mention the circumstances in 
which neoliberalism operates effectively, emphasizing how neoliberal thought has 
been one of the destructive elements throughout the process where the public ended 
up with a collapse. I simply suggest that neoliberal thought accelerated the collapse 
of the public with its attempt/principle to reshape each and every individual with a 
self-centered motivation that encourages to keep one’s focus entirely on the self and 
justify to consider all the others to be sacrificed.  
 
In the second chapter, I have traced the origins of the academic polarization in Turkey 
and explained the different forms the public sphere took. To that end, I studied the 
concept of public sphere beginning from the late Ottoman period until the early re-
publican era and discussed whether these forms could be regarded as Habermasian 
public spheres. As opposed to the academic polarization, I inquired the conditions of 
possibilities of the public sphere in the late Ottoman period and took the friendship 
of Mehmet Akif Ersoy, who manifestly performed a pious Muslim identity, and Mithat 
Cemal Kuntay as a secular intellectual, as an exemplary case.  
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Relying on the monography of Mehmet Akif penned by Mithat Cemal in 1839, I em-
phasized the belittling and hegemonic attitude of Mithat Cemal against Mehmet Akif 
in the early times of their meeting, just as happened in the Turkish academy. At first, 
Mithat Cemal considered Mehmet Akif to be a typical bigoted Muslim and an incom-
petent Ottoman poet. He regarded himself as superior to Mehmet Akif accordingly. 
Yet he was surprised as he saw some qualities which he thought were possessed only 
by himself and which Mehmet Akif could not have had because of his image of a pious 
Muslim (and there were many others who viewed Mehmet Akif just as Mithat Cemal): 
Mehmet Akif knew French so well that he could even discern word nuances and had 
a fluent French accent. He had a comprehensive knowledge of not only Western lit-
erature but also Eastern literature, and he was able to combine these two –a success 
which he never boasted about. Later on, Mithat Cemal began appreciating Mehmet 
Akif's scholarship and decided to learn from him after getting rid of his prejudices. 
Then the two started to meet to read Western and Persian literature.  
 
I studied in this chapter how these two people of opposite views could come to-
gether. The most important factors were that Mehmet Akif, despite his piety, re-
ceived education in positivist schools; that he distinguished daily issues from the is-
sues of religion; and that while never letting any insult to his religion/worldview go 
unanswered, he refrained from meddling with others' lives and religious choices. Ac-
cording to Mithat Cemal, Mehmet Akif was someone who could not fit the mold and 
be assigned to a certain group. He was far from any Muslim stereotype. He did not 
confine himself to an Islamic doctrine and always sought to improve his knowledge 
on various topics. Mehmet Akif also occasionally criticized the lifestyles of his poet 
friends in his poems. But even this did not prevent them from assembling and making 
literary critics because these gatherings were predicated upon tolerance.  
 
His modesty, his openness to every critique as long as it was voiced appropriately and 
his “silence” most importantly, were the fundamental factors which laid the founda-
tions for Mehmet Akif's being effectively present as a Muslim among the seculars. 
Mehmet Akif had moments of silence each of which had quite different meanings. 
His silence stemmed from preferring not to speak about subjects he did not know 
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well. Also, I would suggest that the silence of Mehmet Akif played a crucial role in 
sustaining his relationships with people.  
 
As for the historical development of the formation of the public sphere in the Otto-
man Empire: Although there were coffee shops in the Ottoman Empire since the 16th 
century and a Habermasian public sphere started to appear, the Young Ottomans 
played the most important role in the formation of the public, public opinion and the 
literary public sphere. The Young Ottomans not only brought political solutions to the 
Ottoman Empire's backwardness, but also introduced novelties in literature which 
were conducive to the emergence of the literary public sphere:  the establishment of 
the Translation Bureau in the 19th century, translations of Western literature and the 
foundation of newspapers which helped form the public opinion and discussion. The 
Young Ottomans publicized information through the press and created the possibility 
of public critique (of the state especially) and public to be addressed most im-
portantly. Şinasi's contribution, in particular, should be noted here. Therefore, it 
could be argued that the public sphere on this soil was generated by intellectuals, 
unlike Europe where the bourgeois class pioneered the public sphere. 
 
Coffee shops, the first of which was opened in 1555, changed the codes of sociality 
and enlarged the spaces of socialization. Coffee shops were located in rather central 
places in order to reach out to masses and brought together people from all kinds of 
social groups. It was even observed that the strict social stratification in the Ottoman 
Empire was eroded at times (not least with the Janissary coffee shops). Coffee shops 
were, so to speak, of an academic nature where games were played, and newspapers 
were read out collectively. The topics discussed in these places ranged from politics 
to literature to everyday life matters. Coffee shops sped up the flow of information 
within the Ottoman Empire.  
 
Sometimes coffee shops also witnessed anti-establishment formations and were sub-
jected to prohibitions accordingly. I should remind that the Young Ottomans were 
also meeting in coffee shops. Public storytellers and Karagöz shadow play developed 
their critiques on a performative level. Later on, coffee houses emerged and followed 
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the line of coffee shops more intellectually. Among the topics of debate in coffee 
houses were philosophy, literature and daily politics. Statesmen and authors were 
meeting in coffee houses. Additionally, there were also more private gatherings tak-
ing place in homes. (Being the host of a gathering or having a higher intellectual level 
would imply a superior position among the attendants.) The meetings in İbnülemin 
Mahmut Kemal's home which led to the meeting of Mehmet Akif and Mithat Cemal 
were among the most comprehensive and long-lasting ones.  
 
In sum, I believe my study shows that a Habermasian public sphere was established 
in the late Ottoman period as can be seen in the examples of coffee shops, coffee 
houses and private gatherings –but with the reservation that I have no intention 
whatsoever to idealize the Ottoman Empire. I suggest that the public sphere pio-
neered and maintained by the Young Ottomans and inherited by intellectuals such as 
Mehmet Akif Ersoy and Mithat Cemal Kuntay was instantiated by the relationship 
between the two. Their friendship and the public places where they were present 
together bespeaks the possibility of the public sphere in the Ottoman Empire. The 
cardinal traits of this company were tolerance, humility and intellectuality. Add to 
these the moments of silence of Mehmet Akif, which I think was the most important 
factor that granted their companionship endurance. Today, we are bereft of this re-
maining silent, which involves knowing one's place and avoiding despicable polemics, 
and speaking when needed accordingly; and this silence, I believe, will make commu-
nication possible. I argue that public (sphere) cannot come into being in a country 
such as Turkey which contains elements of both the East and the West unless it is 
accepted that neither is superior to the other and that they are only complementary 
to each other.  
 
In the third chapter, I have started with analyzing the public sphere in the late Otto-
man era and focused on the process that led to the foundation of the republic, ques-
tioning how the public sphere began to be dominated ideologically in the early re-
publican era. I suggest that this ideological domination resulted in the approach that 
marked Islam and Muslims as the “Others” of the country and the polarization be-
tween Muslims and seculars. I tried to understand the roots of this polarization and 
83 
the ways in which it is reflected in intellectual arenas, specifically through the polari-
zation in the academy.  
 
I mainly claim that the secularist discourse in the republican era, considering the way 
it has been a paradigmatic break, has tended to create a homogeneous society by 
absolutizing its entity. Kemalist doctrine has simply established Islam as the republic’s 
“constitutive Other.” While in the pre-republican era, Islam was seen as an indispen-
sable element, in the early republican period, it has begun to be considered an ob-
stacle that prevented the society from reaching the "level of contemporary civiliza-
tions," a threat that triggered the fear of regression. In addition, Islam was desired to 
be confined to its personal dimension by way of limiting the daily manifestations of 
Muslims. Islam was something to be "lived inside" according to Kemalists whereas 
they were enforcing Kemalist practices and rituals everywhere.  
 
The fundamental constituents of this process, upon which the state was structured 
and in which Islam was declared as “the Other,” were laicism, positivism and West-
ernization. These elements have never been open to an ideological debate. In the 
meantime, republican elites played an important role in the restructuring of the Re-
public of Turkey, aiming to educate the people with a "top down" attitude. They al-
ways exalted “reason” and positivism, while they marked Islam as the object of ab-
jection. This attitude triggered a hierarchical and hegemonic structure against Islam, 
namely, the tension between "reactionaries" and "reformists.”  
 
In addition, Islam has been politicized by the secularist and repressive reforms that 
basically aimed to break any ties to Islam. These reforms, in the meantime, also ef-
fectively hindered the possibility of establishing a public sphere and the public opin-
ion. Especially in 1933, the sacking of non-Kemalist academics indicates how these 
reforms directly impressed academic life.  
 
Coffee shops, which constituted the center of the public sphere in the late Ottoman 
period, lost their cultural characteristics during the republican era after becoming 
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spaces that were subjected to political interventions. They mostly positioned them-
selves as the confirming and supporting mechanism of the Kemalist doctrine. It was 
forbidden to talk about many topics, especially the ones regarding politics. Thus the 
public sphere has begun to lose its original identity during the early republic period.  
 
There were also a few coffee houses which either continued to exist since the Otto-
man period or were established in the early republican era and closed during the 
1960s. Although these coffee houses displayed the characteristics of a public sphere, 
some other coffee houses also emerged in the 1940s according to their alignment 
with rightist or leftist camps as a result of the debate of new-old literature. (Küllük 
Kahvesi belonged to the rightist camp whereas Çınaraltı Kahvesi belonged to the left-
ists.) Thus, coffee houses lost their cultural-intellectual function altogether and 
turned into ideology-generating divisive places.  
 
Private gatherings in the early republican era brought together a rather closed society 
comprising high-ranking state officials, bohemians and artists just as in the Ottoman 
era. Moreover, we see that private gatherings were gradually replaced by the public 
ones in patisseries, hotels and bars as a result of social and economic changes. How-
ever, it was decided in some of these gatherings to refrain from holding debates over 
subjects that increasingly become more sensitive such as religion and politics.  
 
Despite the fact that the ideological public sphere that extended up to the 1950s was 
rocked by the Democrat Party's rise to power, Kemalism continued to be the central 
signifier. Social polarization soared in this process because of coups d'etat and per-
meated universities as well. In strict contrast to the argument of Habermas, the public 
sphere in Turkey came into existence out of literary environments and evolved into 
ideological-political places.  
 
The seculars started to fear that they would lose their hegemonic legitimacy with the 
rise of the Islamic movement in the 1980s and the growing visibility of Muslims in the 
public sphere. This fear and echoes of the Kemalist ideology that has prevailed in 
universities since the 1930s can be observed in the academy until the early 2000s 
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too. The inferiority complex against the West that has permeated the Turkish acad-
emy and the forced acceptance of Kemalism as the norm since the early republican 
period laid at the origin of this polarization. Only those, who were living “modern,” 
Westernized lives and discoursing accordingly, were regarded as genuine intellectu-
als. Although there were Muslims who subscribed to secular doctrines after the 
1980s, their faith prevented them from possessing the so-called cultural capital and 
confined their fame to their own communities.  
 
Leftist academics also had the same Kemalist tradition and ideological approach be-
cause they too were indoctrinated by the same hegemonic education. For them, the 
academy was still a fortress that needed to be “liberated” or “protected.” This atti-
tude led them to exclude Muslims from the academy, and otherize and abominate 
them. This biased outlook not only made it difficult for Muslims to exist in the public 
sphere but also impacted the health of the academy. For it limits the academy with 
only generating a certain type of ideology whereas in fact, the academy should have 
been the institution where free thinking and free speech most easily prevail. Secular 
academics were, as it were, “more equal” than the equals and this destroyed the 
possibility of the formation of the public sphere from the beginning by thwarting 
equality which is the most important trait of the public sphere.  
 
The academy was not only surrounded by the Kemalist ideology. Today's neoliberal 
tendency also made it impossible to come together in the academy. As a result, the 
academics engage in mere personal advertisement, have no interest in each other's 
works and communicate only with others who are similar to themselves. They ex-
clude others with their destructive Gemeinschafts to spread their doctrines and legit-
imize their existence.  
 
The communication among Mehmet Akif and his friends, not least Mithat Cemal, was 
one of the best examples of this possibility of the public (sphere), which today rather 
seems like a faint hope. I witness everyday that fair debate and negotiation between 
secular and Muslim intellectuals is disappearing. Along with the shift from public to 
private (fragmented, exclusionary communities), from communication to narcissistic 
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monologues, from debate to fight, Muslim and secular intellectuals have been con-
fronting with each other without benefiting from the intellectual wealth deriving 
from the collision of different ideas. Because the public in the Kemalist Turkey has 
been ideologically based upon, and ruled by, the Kemalist elites since the foundation 
of the republic, it has no longer been a (real) public but rather a polarized, segregated 
and antagonistic one which persists. The absence of the public (sphere) in Turkey is 
not an inescapable fate. For once, the people of Turkey had the experience of the 
public (sphere). However, as far as I observe, today’s academics, who have been sub-
jected to a paradigmatic polarization, continue to run the practices of this unending 
collapse, mainly as responders of the ideological interpellation of Kemalism.  
 
Lastly, I am well aware of both the limitations and the ramifications of this study be-
cause of the simple fact that this is a master's thesis. I did not do any interviews to 
exemplify the polarization in the academy further because my fundamental concern 
was to show the historical trajectory of this polarization. Moreover, interviewing ac-
ademics, secular, or Muslim, would surpass the scope of this thesis and would turn it 
into a rather anthropological project. Here, I need to emphasize that I believe that 
this polarization is still at work today, it rather exists on a personal level and its man-
ifestations among academics go unrecorded. Thus I was obliged to limit my thesis to 
the early 2000s for this very reason. Furthermore, the subject matter of this thesis is 
in fact so extensive that even a PhD thesis could be written about it. Therefore, each 
of the following subjects can further constitute a topic of research in its own right: 
the relation between the literary and the political public spheres in Turkey, the 
intervention of the academic public sphere by the state, the evaluation of the 
academic context of the public sphere in Turkey through other theories of public 
sphere (since Habermas' theory is one particular theory of public sphere among 
others).  
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